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MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS† 
BRANDON L. GARRETT 
ABSTRACT 
Constitutional rulings risk an unnoticed type of mission creep: misplacement 
through adoption in settings that they were not designed to regulate. This Article 
describes how in a set of important areas—and sometimes despite the Supreme 
Court’s explicit cautionary language—constitutional rules have taken hold 
outside of the settings that they were primarily designed to regulate, providing 
unanticipated additions to rules and practice. Constitutional rights and 
standards are often context limited to particular government actors, procedural 
settings, or remedies. Based on the text of the Constitution or precedent, some 
rights apply only during civil cases, while others apply only during criminal 
cases; some regulate executive actors, while others exclusively relate to judicial 
officers. Misplacement can occur if, for example, a right that regulates evidence 
at criminal trials is extended, without support, to regulate executive officers. 
This type of misplacement has occurred in areas including eyewitness evidence, 
civil punitive damages, and the Miranda warnings. In addition, executive actors, 
ranging from administrative agencies to local police, may incorporate into their 
decision-making constitutional rules not intended to provide guidance in such 
settings. In doing so, actors may overprotect or, far more troubling, 
underprotect constitutional rights in unintended ways. It can be quite valuable 
to borrow from constitutional law, including to safeguard rights and harmonize 
nonconstitutional law with constitutional standards. However, doing so requires 
far more careful decision-making beginning with clearer judicial guidance on 
where and to whom constitutional rights should attach. The problem of 
misplaced constitutional rights should be addressed far more carefully by judges 
and government actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional rulings are not just declared by the Supreme Court and then 
applied in a rote fashion by lower courts. Constitutional rights must be 
interpreted and implemented by varied government actors, and they may 
influence various branches of government and public opinion. When 
constitutional rights are intended to regulate government actors, complex 
questions may arise with regard to the implementation of those rights in areas 
including criminal procedure, all the way from the initial investigations to 
assertions of rights as defenses in criminal cases; civil damages awards; and 
actions seeking injunctive relief against government agencies or officials.1 In 
this Article, I develop a set of shadow consequences in which actors use 
constitutional rights intended to inform rules and practice in one setting in a 
different and unauthorized setting instead. Those constitutional standards are 
thus misplaced.  
Constitutional text or interpretation can limit the reach of a constitutional right 
to a particular actor, procedural context, or remedy.2 Some rights govern federal 
and not state actors.3 Some rights provide a remedy in civil cases seeking 
damages but not during criminal trials, or vice versa.4 If an executive, judicial, 
or legislative actor applies a constitutional right or standard to (1) the wrong 
government actor, (2) the wrong procedural setting, or (3) the wrong remedy, 
constitutional law can be—as I call it in this Article for lack of an existing term 
for the phenomenon—misplaced. To be sure, in many areas, government actors 
can choose to provide greater protection than the Constitution demands; the 
Constitution typically provides a floor, not a ceiling.5 In still other areas, the 
 
1 This Article builds on an earlier piece that develops what rules should govern the 
intersection of constitutional and evidence law. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, 
Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 57 (2015). There, I argue 
that the intersection is undertheorized and that courts require clearer rules for resolving 
conflicts. Id. at 59. I further argue that sound protection of constitutional interests may be far 
more compatible with evidence law rules than often supposed but only if there is careful 
engagement with the potential impact of the constitutional rule on evidence practice. Id. at 
87-98. For an exploration of the “creep,” or the influence of constitutional amendment 
provisions on interpretation of substantive rights—an interesting but different, structural 
question—see generally Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115 MICH. L. REV. 215 
(2016). 
2 For a description of how constitutional rights can be developed through decision rules 
that spell out obligations for particular government actors, see generally, for example, 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
3 For examples, see infra Section I.A. 
4 For examples, see infra Section I.B. 
5 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495, 503 (1977) (“[M]ore and more state courts are construing 
state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of 
their states even more protection than the federal provisions . . . .”); William F. Swindler, 
Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice: Federal Floor and State Ceiling, 49 MO. L. 
REV. 1, 7-11 (1984) (discussing Missouri’s and Virginia’s changes to their state constitutions 
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Supreme Court may not have clearly articulated to which actors or procedural 
settings a right may be applicable or what remedies may be available for 
violations of the right. In such instances there is no misplacement, as described 
here, if such placement options remain undefined or open.  
When an application of a constitutional right does occur in clear contravention 
of text or precedent, then such misplacement can under- and overprotect 
constitutional rights in important ways that have not been adequately 
understood. One example of a misplaced constitutional standard—an unintended 
use of a constitutional rule in an evidentiary context—occurs with the Miranda 
v. Arizona6 requirement that police provide a suspect the well-known set of 
admonitions before proceeding with a custodial interrogation.7 Those warnings, 
which now stand on a firmer constitutional foundation,8 were never designed to 
guide jurors in assessing the value of confession evidence at a criminal trial but 
rather were designed to deter abusive questioning tactics.9 And yet, as I describe 
in this Article, some state courts include in their standard form jury instructions 
a statement that jurors should consider whether Miranda warnings were given;10 
if Miranda was violated, then the evidence should not come in at trial. This jury 
instruction does not serve a protective role. Instead, it may underprotect the right 
by suggesting to jurors that, by having waived Miranda rights, a defendant’s 
confession might be per se voluntary. 
A similar example can be found regarding the Supreme Court’s due process 
decision in Manson v. Brathwaite,11 which requires that a judge suppress unduly 
suggestive and unreliable eyewitness evidence.12 The rule was designed to 
 
in light of federal constitutional interpretations). 
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
7 Id. at 478-79 (“[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, . . . [h]e 
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an 
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires.”). 
8 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (affirming constitutional nature of 
Miranda ruling). 
9 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58 (describing nature of interrogation tactics used by law 
enforcement and stating that “[u]nless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is 
achieved—such as these decisions will advance—there can be no assurance that practices of 
this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future”). 
10 See infra Section I.C. For a larger overview of state law standards in the area and how 
state courts have moved away from the constitutional floor, see Thomas D. Albright & 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Law and Science of Eyewitness Evidence 70 (Aug. 3, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3675055 
[https://perma.cc/23AB-XLUC]. 
11 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
12 Id. at 114. 
 
2020] MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2089 
render some identification evidence inadmissible,13 not to instruct a jury on how 
to weigh admissible eyewitness evidence. Yet, as I will describe, many state 
courts that provide instructions regarding eyewitness evidence have 
incorporated the Manson due process test into their model jury instructions.14 In 
important ways, these jury instructions may mislead jurors regarding the factors 
that make an eyewitness identification more or less reliable. This conclusion is 
informed by a large body of scientific research conducted in the decades since 
the Manson ruling.15 Not only should the constitutional standard not be used to 
advise jurors—it was never intended to be used in the courtroom in that 
fashion—but this use of the constitutional standard is also increasingly out of 
date.16  
In a set of important and unrelated areas, and sometimes despite the Supreme 
Court’s cautionary language, constitutional rules have taken hold outside of the 
settings that they were primarily designed to regulate, providing unanticipated 
additions to evidence rules and practice and more. Perhaps most troubling are 
the judicial decisions that profess not to alter other bodies of law but that have 
had that very effect. Rulings by the Court that were designed to elaborate the 
underlying constitutional right have done more; they have become part of the 
instructions given to a jury when weighing evidence in a case, have affected 
rules for admissibility of expert evidence, and have affected prosecution 
decisions, among other things. Extending constitutional rulings in this manner 
may actually erode rights. The Court may have carefully limited a right due to a 
concern with one remedy, such as an exclusion remedy at trial, without intending 
to foreclose another remedy, such as damages. Extending the limited form of the 
right may incorrectly close off all constitutional remedies altogether.  
This problem of overextension of constitutional standards in new contexts 
could not be more prominent than in the area of police use of force. In high-
profile cases, prosecutors decide whether to charge officers who use deadly 
force.17 In this context, civil constitutional standards have influenced 
prosecutors deciding whether to criminally charge police for using deadly force. 
To take one high-profile example, after former Cleveland police officer Timothy 
Loehmann shot and killed Tamir Rice, Timothy McGinty, the Cuyahoga County 
 
13 Id. (“We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
14 See infra Section II.C. 
15 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (summarizing research on 
eyewitness memory and criticizing Manson factors as not supported by that scientific 
research). I note that I served on the committee that produced that report. 
16 See id. at 31-44 (summarizing developments in state statutes and judicial rulings). For a 
longer exploration of these changes, see Garrett & Albright, supra note 10, at 30-61. 
17 See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, 
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 633 (“This country 
has seen an increase in the number of officer-involved homicide prosecutions over the last 
several years.”). 
 
2090 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:2085 
prosecutor, concluded that his office should not present charges to a grand jury.18 
In presenting that conclusion to the public in a detailed report, McGinty cited 
Fourth Amendment rulings in civil, not criminal, cases.19 McGinty likely felt 
more secure citing to the authority of federal constitutional rulings despite 
making a decision whether to prosecute for a state law crime. While not legally 
wrong—it was an exercise of discretion and the prosecutor could have offered 
no justification at all—the use of a misplaced constitutional standard raises a 
different set of questions in that context. An important and unexplored question 
remains regarding the use of constitutional rights as justification. 
Constitutional rights may go perversely underenforced through the extension 
of constitutional rulings to settings that they were not designed to apply to.20 I 
argue that far more attention is owed to this problem of misplaced constitutional 
language in the murky and poorly understood operation of rules on the ground, 
at trials, and in still less clearly defined decision-making by executive officials. 
I suggest how courts can address the problem and how higher courts can 
intervene if lower courts do not. I also describe how executive actors and 
lawmakers can rethink constitutional floors and ceilings. 
This set of problems is a subset of a larger problem of constitutional drift. 
Frederick Schauer has pointed out that, “[i]n interpretive arenas below the 
Supreme Court, one good quote [from the Supreme Court] is worth a hundred 
clever analyses of the holding.”21 Casual phrases and entire doctrines can serve 
purposes entirely unintended from, and even at odds with, their origins. Supreme 
Court rulings and language from holdings can migrate into other rulings and 
contexts. In other contexts, the primary concern is with politically unaccountable 
judges rendering rulings that constrain democracy.22 What is novel about the 
problem of misplaced rights, however, is that while constitutional law can and 
often does inform government actors in productive ways that can safeguard 
against the erosion of constitutional rights in litigation, misplacement of 
constitutional standards can do the opposite.23 While we are familiar with 
 
18 TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 
22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE 70 (2015) [hereinafter CUYAHOGA REPORT], 
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Rice%20Case%20Report 
%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y5V-HHAR]. 
19 Id. at 39, 70 (discussing Fourth Amendment case law concerning whether officers’ 
actions were reasonable and whether officers should receive qualified immunity). 
20 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 54, 149-52 (1997) (“On the whole, the Court’s selection of tests has produced doctrines 
that tend more to underprotect than to overprotect constitutional norms.”); Kermit Roosevelt 
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1667-86 (2005); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978). 
21 Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (book 
review). 
22 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the 
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985). 
23 See generally, e.g., Garrett, supra note 1 (describing the consequences of constitutional 
law being imported into the evidentiary context). 
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constitutional prophylactic rules aimed at protecting rights, there is scarce 
literature about the opposite: misplaced use of constitutional standards that can 
erode rights. 
In this Article, I conclude that far more care is warranted where constitutional 
standards were not intended to create constitutional law. That lower courts, 
executive actors, and others may build on the constitutional floor and incorporate 
constitutional norms into their decision-making is unremarkable. That actors 
may instead adopt uses contrary to the substance of constitutional law, however, 
suggests that far more attention should be paid to how rights are administered in 
practice.  
I. PLACEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Constitutional rights, based on both the text of the Constitution and the 
development of standards to interpret those rights, may apply to particular 
government actors, stages of proceedings, or types of proceedings, and they may 
call for specific remedies. First, this Part describes how constitutional rights can 
sometimes apply to particular government actors: some to federal actors; some 
to state and local actors; and some primarily to executive, judicial, or legislative 
officers. Second, constitutional rights may apply to all or just portions of a 
proceeding—such as providing remedies pretrial versus during a trial—while 
other rights apply at any stage or are not determinate. Third, rights may provide 
only particular remedies based on text, interpretation, or the implementation of 
statutes. In each of the following Sections, I provide brief examples of how each 
of these three ways in which constitutional rights may be defined and placed 
relate to the problem of subsequent misplacement. 
A. Rights Attached to Government Actors 
Constitutional rights based on text or precedent do not always apply to all 
possible actors or remedies available against those actors. Often, the Supreme 
Court has held that a constitutional doctrine or standard provides a remedy for 
its violation only in a particular context. Sometimes, constitutional text makes 
clear to which government actor its strictures and resulting remedies are 
addressed.24 For example, not all constitutional rights apply to state as opposed 
to federal actors.25 Some constitutional rights, as a matter of text, apply to 
criminal procedure and not to civil actions.26 Some constitutional rights are 
exclusively directed at executive actors and not at judicial actors.27 Some are 
 
24 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 
YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973) (discussing how mootness doctrine is aimed at federal judiciary 
in its entirety). 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
27 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (holding that “unlawful search or seizure itself” violates the Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and that judicial “use of fruits 
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directed at Congress.28 Others still, such as the Thirteenth and Twenty-First 
Amendments, are arguably also directed at private actors.29  
Many rights, however, do not make clear which actors they are addressed to 
and anticipate a judicial role in their enforcement. For example, some rights, like 
those created by the Fourth Amendment, are directed first at executive actors 
with the expectation that judicial officers then enforce them in litigation.30 Other 
rights, like those created the Due Process Clauses,31 have extremely broad 
language capable of being applied in civil and criminal cases against both state 
and federal executive, legislative, and judicial officers. Sometimes, the Supreme 
Court has extended constitutional text to reach additional actors—for example, 
incorporating most provisions of the Bill of Rights as against states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 In so doing, the Court 
required states to adopt constitutional floors to minimally comply with the 
Constitution. However, the Court typically does not impose constitutional 
ceilings. That is, states are free to exceed the strictures of the Constitution and 
provide greater remedies and protections. Although the Court has sometimes 
restricted Congress’s ability to impose greater strictures on states than the 
Constitution provides,33 state and local actors can exceed the Constitution to 
impose additional protections. 
To be sure, even if a constitutional right clearly applies—based on text and 
precedent—to a government actor, there may be difficult questions about 
whether a plaintiff has standing to assert a constitutional right, depending on 
 
of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong” (alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974))). 
28 For example, certain Article I provisions, such as the Commerce Clause, may be asserted 
as a jurisdictional defense in litigation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Other Article I 
provisions directly limit Congress’s authority and can be asserted affirmatively or as a defense 
if violative legislation was enforced. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post 
facto Law shall be passed.”). 
29 See id. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation 
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”); id. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”). 
30 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 
1240 (2010) (“The Fourth Amendment is written in the passive voice, so it does not specify 
who may violate it. But text and structure strongly suggest that the Fourth Amendment is 
concerned with executive and judicial actions rather than legislative actions.” (emphasis 
added)). 
31 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
32 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
is applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
33 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that congressional 
expansion of First Amendment freedoms via Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded 
Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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their injury and the government actor being sued.34 A constitutional right might 
not be legally cognizable if asserted by a particular type of plaintiff given a lack 
of a sufficiently concrete injury. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes, for federalism reasons, restricted the claims available to plaintiffs 
and the remedies that courts can award against state and local actors for 
constitutional violations.35 
An area in which some observers view the Court as having itself misplaced a 
right is the sovereign immunity doctrine. The Eleventh Amendment clearly 
applies, based on its text, to cases in which a citizen of one state sues another 
state.36 However, beginning in Hans v. Louisiana,37 and more recently in cases 
like Alden v. Maine,38 the Court has extended that rule of immunity to cases in 
which a citizen sues the state of the person’s citizenship in both federal and state 
court—based not just on the text of the Eleventh Amendment but also on the 
Tenth Amendment, unwritten structural federalism principles, and principles of 
political accountability.39 The Court had already sharply limited the ability of 
Congress to abrogate that immunity in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.40 Thus, the 
Court extended the right to different actors being sued in different courts and 
ruled that Congress could not undo those extensions of the doctrine by statute. 
This area is arguably full of misplacement.41 However, in this Article, I focus 
not on whether the Supreme Court has correctly placed a right but whether lower 
courts, lawmakers, and executive actors follow the Court’s rulings regarding 
placement of rights. 
 
34 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (finding that federal 
court lacked jurisdiction to issue injunctions against state actors when plaintiff’s asserted 
injury was conjectural). 
35 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-78 (1976) (relying on “important 
considerations of federalism” in declining to recognize a “right to mandatory equitable relief 
in some form when those in supervisory positions do not institute steps to reduce the incidence 
of unconstitutional police misconduct”). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see also 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“[T]he text of the Amendment would 
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . .”). 
37 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
38 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
39 See id. at 712; Hans, 134 U.S. at 15-18. 
40 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (“We hold that notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent 
to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant 
Congress that power, and therefore § 2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that 
does not consent to be sued.”). 
41 As William Marshall and Jason Cowart have put it: “State immunity jurisprudence is 
not generally known for its great legal craftsmanship.” William P. Marshall & Jason S. 
Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1069, 1088 (2000). 
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A constitutional right can be misplaced if a suit is allowed against the wrong 
government actor. For example, a federal court cannot permit a suit against an 
individual prosecutor based on criminal procedure violations at a trial; the 
Supreme Court has found that such prosecutorial misconduct is protected by 
absolute immunity.42 The only avenues available to victims of such violations 
are a challenge to the conviction on appeal, a post-conviction challenge, or a 
civil suit against law enforcement. Conversely, states could misplace this 
constitutional rule by citing the absolute immunity defense in a federal suit 
against a prosecutor pursuant to a state regulation. In doing so, states would be 
wrong to cite to this rule to foreclose state remedies, which may build upon the 
constitutional floor. A state court citing to the federal doctrine of absolute 
immunity—a doctrine based on an interpretation of a federal statute43—would 
be relying on a misplaced interpretation of a federal cause of action for 
constitutional litigation. If the state court cited to the federal doctrine purely as 
informative or as an example of a leading approach, that would not be 
problematic, although reasonable people could disagree whether federal law is 
informative on that point. However, if the state court cites to federal doctrine as 
authoritative, that would be an error. 
In general, federal constitutional limitations do not apply to private actors 
under the state action doctrine. Nevertheless, good arguments exist that private 
institutions should adopt constitutional norms and protections, and statutes may 
require them to do so. In so doing, constitutional rights or norms are not 
necessarily misplaced. 
B. Rights Attached to Procedural Settings 
Constitutional rights can attach to particular procedural settings. Rights may 
apply to all or just portions of a proceeding—for example, by providing 
remedies pretrial or instead during a trial—while other rights apply at any stage 
or are indeterminate. Thus, jury trial rights based on text extend to trial 
proceedings but not to other types of nontrial hearings or investigations. The 
Sixth Amendment applies “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,”44 and therefore its 
provisions, such as the right to counsel, apply in criminal cases but not in 
administrative or other types of hearings.45 That text has been interpreted not to 
apply to all phases of a criminal investigation but rather only to “critical” stages 
at which substantial rights of the accused may be at stake.46 In contrast, other 
rights apply during police investigations, such as Fourth Amendment rights.47 
The Supreme Court has also elaborated constitutional standards that govern 
 
42 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (finding that prosecutor’s office 
could not be held liable for failure to train prosecutors “based on a single Brady violation”). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
44 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
45 Thus, the right to representation at civil commitment hearings is a due process right and 
not a Sixth Amendment right. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-97 (1980). 
46 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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criminal procedure at trials. For example, the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to 
criminal cases and not civil cases, as the Court has made clear.48 
Yet sometimes the Supreme Court has interpreted the same amendment—and 
even the same clause of the same amendment—to have different civil and 
criminal applications. For example, Fourth Amendment protections against the 
unreasonable use of force may create civil remedies but do not impact criminal 
trials.49 Fourth Amendment search and seizure rules may create both civil 
remedies50 and exclusionary remedies during criminal trials,51 but the Court has 
held that they do not apply during grand jury proceedings.52 The Court has held 
that Fourth Amendment rights cannot be raised in federal post-conviction 
litigation, but they can be raised during trial or on appeal.53 The Court has also 
held that a range of constitutional criminal procedure rights that call into 
question the validity of a conviction can be raised in a civil case but only after a 
conviction has been reversed.54 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly stepped in 
to police these boundaries of rights guaranteed in civil, criminal, and post-
conviction litigation.55 
Thus, constitutional rights may also apply during more than one stage, such 
as during both investigations and trials. An example of the Supreme Court 
extending a right to executive officers—specifically, at a preliminary stage—is 
the well-known prophylactic Miranda right, or what Henry Monaghan has called 
“constitutional common law.”56 The Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination is a trial right but has been interpreted to include a privilege that 
may be asserted during investigations. The goal of Miranda was to provide 
additional guidance to police officers who question individuals, sometimes 
unrepresented by counsel, before any court proceeding at which a person might 
assert Fifth Amendment privilege before a judge.57 By “[r]equiring Miranda 
warnings before custodial interrogation,” the Supreme Court has explained, it 
 
48 Ky. Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 153 (1911). 
49 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388-89 (1989). 
50 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
51 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
52 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342, 354-55 (1974). 
53 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (denying habeas corpus relief to prisoners 
despite finding that evidence used to convict them was seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because state process provided them the opportunity for “full and fair litigation” 
of Fourth Amendment claims). 
54 See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 
55 For a description of the Court’s efforts to police boundaries between civil and post-
conviction litigation, see Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal 
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 53-55. 
56 Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1975); accord Berman, supra note 2; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988). 
57 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (“We granted certiorari in these 
cases . . . to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts 
to follow.”). 
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sought to “provide[] ‘practical reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right.”58 
The rule applies to law enforcement and is aimed at reinforcing police 
compliance with the Fifth Amendment. The right is also to be enforced in court; 
after all, if police violate the requirement, then there are exclusionary 
consequences at a criminal trial.59 As such, the right first attaches at a 
preliminary stage, before police questioning begins, and can then be asserted in 
court. 
These detailed specifications can result in misplaced constitutional rights if a 
court applies the standard to a stage of proceedings to which the text or precedent 
had not previously applied it. Thus, if a judicial or executive officer applies the 
Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial to a purely administrative trial or 
applies the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial to a civil matter, 
such actions would go beyond the constitutional text and beyond precedent. 
While a state can choose to exceed the constitutional floor, it would be incorrect 
to cite to the Sixth Amendment as a binding source. Similarly, based on rulings 
like Heck v. Humphrey,60 it would be incorrect to allow a person to sue in federal 
court for civil damages to remedy an alleged violation of a criminal procedure 
right that implicates the validity of the conviction before the conviction itself 
has been reversed.61 
Conversely, it would be misplaced to cite to federal constitutional law as 
regulating a stage during which federal courts themselves do not apply the right 
or provide a remedy. While that federal constitutional law may be informative, 
it also may not be if the federal rule was designed to regulate a different type of 
proceeding. For example, the scope of the right to counsel at a criminal trial 
might not be informative in a civil matter. As such, it would be misplaced to cite 
to the Heck rule to bar a civil case once a conviction has in fact been properly 
reversed, since the rule’s rationale was to prevent an end run around criminal 
appeals and post-conviction litigation. 
A counterexample illustrates how the Supreme Court is very much capable of 
addressing faulty repurposing of constitutional rights when an abuse catches the 
Justices’ attention. In Crane v. Kentucky,62 the state court had refused to let the 
defendant introduce the circumstances of a confession at trial, including that the 
defendant, when interrogated, had made statements inconsistent with the crime 
scene evidence.63 The state court apparently reasoned that this effort to cast into 
question the credibility of the confession was not proper because, as the 
prosecutor contended, the judge had already ruled before trial that, as a “legal 
 
58 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433, 444 (1974)). 
59 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (discussing admissibility of statements obtained through 
interrogation). 
60 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
61 Id. at 487-88. 
62 476 U.S. 683 (1986). 
63 Id. at 685-86. 
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matter,” the confession was voluntary under the Constitution.64 The Court 
addressed the issue head-on, ruling that such a view of the role of a constitutional 
voluntariness analysis “is premised on a misconception about the role of 
confessions in a criminal trial.”65 As the Court stated, in “laying down” due 
process rules regulating the voluntariness of confessions, a judge’s “pretrial 
voluntariness determination does not undercut the defendant’s traditional 
prerogative to challenge the confession’s reliability during the course of the 
trial.”66 The exclusion of the evidence surrounding the circumstances of the 
confession itself “deprived petitioner of his fundamental constitutional right to 
a fair opportunity to present a defense.”67 
C. Rights Attached to Remedies 
Constitutional rights can provide remedies specific to the right, due to text or 
judicial interpretation of the right.68 Sometimes the Supreme Court develops a 
standard to apply during a particular stage of litigation. For example, while the 
Due Process Clause regulates civil and criminal proceedings, the Court has 
elaborated applications of the clause specific to criminal trials.69 In other 
situations, the Court has decided that a standard for a constitutional remedy in 
one area is useful in another. If so, there can be a convergence of common 
constitutional standards.70 Similar rules may be adopted across constitutional 
rights regarding qualified immunity, tailoring of injunctive remedies, and 
liability of local officers. 
How can these specifications result in misplaced constitutional remedies? To 
provide one example, in the Miranda context it would be wrong to provide an 
exclusionary remedy in a civil trial for a non-Mirandized statement; Miranda is 
intended to provide a remedy against self-incrimination. A question raised was 
whether there is a right to civil damages, as opposed to solely criminal 
exclusionary remedies, if police violate Miranda. In Chavez v. Martinez,71 the 
Court held that the remedies are solely criminal exclusionary remedies, not civil 
ones.72 If a federal court provided a civil damages remedy for a Miranda 
 
64 Id. at 686. 
65 Id. at 687. 
66 Id. at 688. 
67 Id. at 687. 
68 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983); Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857, 860 
(1999). 
69 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (stating that it does not satisfy due 
process requirements “if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial 
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate 
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured”). 
70 See Thomas K.S. Fu, Against Doctrinal Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 296 (2014). 
71 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
72 Id. at 772-73. 
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violation prior to the Chavez ruling, perhaps it would not be misapplying the 
constitutional right; the question was not settled. However, following the 
Court’s ruling in Chavez, such damages would be the wrong remedy for a 
violation. 
D. Interpretation Drawing on Multiple Sources  
A different type of citation to authority can occur when a court relies on 
multiple constitutional sources to support a general proposition or relies on law 
in one area to influence interpretation in another. These situations would not be 
misplacements in the way that I describe here, although there may be much to 
critique (or recommend) in drawing conclusions based on structure or text across 
provisions of the Constitution. As John Manning has described, sometimes a 
court cites to an area of law not as binding but as influential.73 For example, to 
cite to the Ex Post Facto Clause in support of a more general interpretive canon 
or principle of nonretroactivity applicable in civil cases may be an inappropriate 
leap.74 However, while the analogy made by drawing on a range of constitutional 
sources to support a canon of interpretation may be forced or inappropriate, it is 
not formal misplacement as I describe it here. The Court is formally drawing on 
multiple sources for constitutional authority and is not seeking to apply a 
constitutional right or standard to a new area without justifying its decision to 
do so. 
II. MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON COURTS 
In a range of areas, constitutional rights have influenced courts in ways in 
which they were not intended to do so. For example, judicial actors have adopted 
constitutional floors in areas in which the rights were primarily intended to apply 
to executive actors: during the pretrial stage, during police questioning, and in 
providing a potential exclusionary remedy before trial. This has occurred in the 
context of the well-known Miranda warnings; some courts have misplaced the 
right as a component of jury instructions. In other contexts, judges have similarly 
misplaced pretrial rights in jury instructions at trial. These misplacements have 
occurred in the context of the central due process test for regulating eyewitness 
evidence, constitutional remedies such as qualified immunity law, and due 
process rules regarding punitive damages. These misplacements have also 
influenced jury instructions and, as a result, civil and criminal trials. One reason 
for these misplacements may simply be that trial judges and drafters of jury 
instructions look to authoritative pronouncements from the Supreme Court and 
to constitutional law when drafting instructions, hoping to avoid reversible 
errors. In doing so, jury instructions parrot constitutional language for 
 
73 John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 
432 (2010). 
74 Id. at 404, 435 (arguing that, because the Ex Post Facto Clause proscribes enactment of 
retroactive criminal penalties, the Founders specifically determined the ways in which and to 
what degree to limit the Clause and thus to “[a]bstract[] from that specific proscription to a 
background value of nonretroactivity . . . makes nonsense of [the] constitutionmaking 
process”). 
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evidentiary uses not anticipated by the opinions that defined those constitutional 
rights. As such, these instructions can then work against the Court’s goal in 
creating the underlying constitutional right. 
I focus in this Part on such examples of unintended and potentially perverse 
uses of constitutional rights at both the pretrial and trial stages. These uses 
include (1) jury instructions that eyewitness identifications should be evaluated 
using Supreme Court–derived “reliability” factors that not only do not 
correspond with reliability but were never intended to serve that function; 
(2) jury instructions affected by Supreme Court rulings on punitive damages 
originally designed to guide appellate review; (3) jury instructions suggesting 
that Miranda compliance somehow provides evidence of voluntariness, despite 
the fact that the Miranda rule was designed to protect against coercion in the 
interrogation room; and (4) the misuse of criminal appeal standards in civil 
rights litigation.  
A. Eyewitness Identifications: Instructing Jurors on Reliability 
The Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite adopted an approach seeking to 
reconcile due process concerns with evidentiary concerns in the area of 
eyewitness identifications.75 The Court famously emphasized that “reliability is 
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”76 The 
“reliability” factors as adopted by the Court ask that the judge examine: (1) the 
eyewitness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the 
eyewitness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the description that the 
eyewitness gave of the criminal, (4) the eyewitness’s level of certainty at the 
time of the identification procedure, and (5) the length of time between the crime 
and the identification procedure.77 Scholars have criticized the test—and I 
among them—but that is not the focus here.78 The focus here is on the use that 
this test has been put to, wholly outside of the question of whether a trial judge 
should have admitted the eyewitness testimony. 
That due process test solely regulates the preliminary question of whether to 
admit eyewitness testimony at trial, not how that trial should be conducted if the 
testimony was properly admitted. Having admitted such testimony, traditionally, 
judges provide the jury with brief instructions regarding eyewitness 
 
75 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977). 
76 Id. at 114. 
77 Id. 
78 For examples of the criticism of the Supreme Court’s due process test in light of 
subsequent scientific research, see generally, for example, Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment, 
The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness 
Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189 (2006); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson 
v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109 (2006); and Gary L. Wells & 
Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s 
Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 
(2009). 
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identifications. Such instructions typically remind the jury to consider the 
credibility of an eyewitness like that of any other witness or briefly instruct the 
jurors that any eyewitness identification is part of the prosecutor’s burden of 
proof in a criminal case (although a few states in recent years have adopted more 
detailed jury instructions).79 The Supreme Court, in its ruling in Manson, did not 
state any intent to regulate the manner in which a jury would be instructed; the 
question that the Justices decided was whether and when a judge might exclude 
eyewitness identification evidence.80 
That is why I was quite surprised to learn that, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Manson, some state courts supplemented general jury instructions 
with respect to judging the credibility of witnesses by including in specific jury 
instructions on eyewitness evidence the “reliability” factors named by the Court. 
For example, in 1991, the Connecticut Supreme Court approved instructions in 
which the judge instructed the jury: 
[W]hen deciding the question of identification it should . . . consider the 
“totality of all the circumstances affecting identification,” listing the 
following specific factors: 
“the opportunity which the witness had to observe the person, the degree 
of certainty of the identification made in court, whether the witness knew 
or had seen the person before the identification, the circumstances and 
degree of certainty or uncertainty of any out of court identifications 
made . . . the length of time available to make the observations of the 
perpetrator . . . the lighting conditions at the time of the crime, any 
physical descriptions that the witness may have given to the police, the 
physical and emotional condition of the witness at the time of the 
incident and the witness’ powers of observation . . . .”81 
Other states do the same. Having surveyed jury instructions in all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia, I found that eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia adopt some standalone instruction on the subject of eyewitness 
identification evidence that repeats some version of the factors from the Manson 
test.82 For example, the Illinois instruction emphasizes that the “new instruction 
 
79 New Jersey courts used such instructions a decade before State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872, 928 (N.J. 2011). See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 754 A.2d 1153, 1157 (N.J. 2000) (“It is 
your function as jurors to determine what weight, if any, to give to this testimony. You must 
decide whether it is sufficiently reliable evidence upon which to conclude that this defendant 
is the person who committed the offenses charged.”). 
80 Manson, 432 U.S. at 99. 
81 State v. Tatum, 595 A.2d 322, 330 (Conn. 1991) (third and fourth alterations in original), 
overruled in part by State v. Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 830 (Conn. 2016). 
82 They are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 
§ 3.15 (2017) [hereinafter ILL. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS], https://courts.illinois.gov 
/CircuitCourt/CriminalJuryInstructions/CRIM _03.00.pdf [https://perma.cc/E57H-953J]; 
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simply lists factors well-established by case law” and promptly cites, first in the 
list of authorities, to Manson.83 While a decade ago, the vast majority of states 
would have had instructions of that type, in recent years, many states have 
revised their eyewitness identification jury instruction, departing from the 
Manson model. Fifteen states—Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia—have included some alterations, 
including modestly taking into account some of the more recent social science 
research on eyewitness memory.84 The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently 
 
MICH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MODEL CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7-11 (2020) [hereinafter MICH. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS], 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/criminal-jury-
instructions/Documents/Criminal%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN9A-
H9V4]. In some states, such as in South Carolina, the model instructions predate Manson and 
reflect the D.C. Circuit’s recommended charges in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 
558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See RALPH KING ANDERSON, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA REQUESTS TO 
CHARGE – CRIMINAL § 6-1 (2d ed. 2012). Although in the past Alaska did not require any 
standard instructions and simply recommended the Telfaire approach, a recent ruling by the 
Alaska Supreme Court called for the drafting of revised jury instructions, which were then 
promulgated in 2020. ALASKA CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., ALASKA 
CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 1.24 (2020) (citing Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 
427 (Alaska 2016)), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/crpji/docs/1.24.docx 
[https://perma.cc/4VZ9-MD6J] . 
83 ILL. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 82, § 3.15 committee note, at 19. 
84 For example, the Florida instruction tells juries to consider whether the witness and 
offender are of different races or ethnic groups and does not include confidence as a factor. 
FLA. SUPREME COURT, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.9(c) (2018), 
https://jury.flcourts.org/wp-content/uploads/Criminal/chapters/chapter3/p1c3s3.9.c.rtf 
[https://perma.cc/7FD6-MAH8]. The Georgia Supreme Court altered its instruction, which 
had adopted the Manson factors, to no longer emphasize confidence of the eyewitness. See 
Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005). The Kansas Supreme Court followed that 
same approach. See State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 575 (Kan. 2003), overruled in part by State 
v. Mitchell, 275 P.3d 905, 912-13 (Kan. 2012) (holding that “it is error to instruct the jury on 
the degree of certainty factor” and “discourag[ing] its future use”). The Supreme Court in 
Utah altered its instruction to focus on the effects of suggestion, as did the Connecticut 
Supreme Court. See State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 69-71 (Conn. 2009); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991), abrogated by State v. Antonio Lujan, 459 P.3d 992, 995-
96 (Utah 2020) (overruling suggestion that admissibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony should be judged under a due process standard and holding that admissibility of 
this kind of evidence should be measured by the Utah rules of evidence; see also CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 2.6-4 cmt. (2019) (citing, inter alia, State v. Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 817 (Conn. 2016)), 
https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB5L-78LJ]. New Jersey has 
now adopted a revised and detailed jury instruction that rejects the Manson factors as a model. 
See infra notes 176-79. Ohio revised its jury instruction in response to a statute requiring 
adoption of eyewitness identification procedures. See OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., OHIO 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL § 409.05 (2012); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.831 
(West 2020). Virginia revised its jury instructions to include an eyewitness-specific 
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and prominently outright rejected the Manson approach.85 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Council in 2015 “review[ed] the scholarly research, analyses 
by other courts, amici submissions,” and a report by a Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Council Study Group on Eyewitness Identification that recommended 
that judges provide a revised set of jury instructions on eyewitness identification 
evidence.86 As a result, it included scientific principles in its eyewitness 
identification jury instruction.87 The Hawaiian courts have done the same in 
recent years.88 
Sixteen of the other states do not specifically provide separate instructions on 
eyewitness evidence and instead generally instruct jurors that their task is to 
judge the credibility of witnesses, and one additional state has no criminal 
pattern instructions of any type.89 
Some state courts have also gone further and incorporated language from 
Supreme Court opinions on a related topic: the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel at lineups. These courts have provided and approved jury instructions 
that inform the jury that there may be an “independent source” for an in-court 
identification, despite questions concerning earlier pretrial identification 
procedures.90 As I have written elsewhere, there is nothing “independent” about 
 
instruction. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS – 
CRIMINAL no. 2.800 (2019), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/circuit/resources/model 
_jury_instructions _criminal.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFT3-RFZC]. In addition, certain states 
have adopted separate common-law tests concerning show-up identifications. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423 
N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 599 (Wis. 2005), 
overruled by State v. Roberson, 935 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Wis. 2019) (overturning Dubose and 
“return[ing] to [the court’s] past practice of following decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court in regard to criteria that are necessary to accord due process in eyewitness 
identifications”). North Carolina instructs witnesses regarding departures from statutorily 
mandated lineup practices. N.C. CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES COMM. ON 
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS, NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL 
CASES § 105.65 (2010), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/pji-master 
/criminal/105.65.pdf [https://perma.cc/99ED-D3KU]. 
85 See infra notes 176-79. 
86 Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 905, 909-10 (Mass. 2015). 
87 Id. at 909-10. 
88 See, e.g., State v. Kaneaiakala, 450 P.3d 761, 774 (Haw. 2019) (“As a result of our 
holding in Cabinatan, the Jury Instructions Committee also promulgated Hawaiʻi Standard 
Instruction 3.19A regarding show-up identifications . . . .”); State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 
1027, 1035-39 (Haw. 2012) (holding that when eyewitness evidence is a central issue, a court 
must, at defendant’s request, give a specific jury instruction about factors affecting 
reliability); see also HAW. SUPREME COURT, HAW. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 
no. 3.19 (2014), https://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/legal_references/criminal_Jury 
_Instructions_oct _2014ada.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5YZ-LCQD]. 
89 Those states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, 
and Wyoming. Rhode Island has no pattern criminal jury instructions. 
90 See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 713 P.2d 273, 281 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (“You are instructed 
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the memory of an eyewitness in the courtroom.91 Regardless, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at lineups was designed to ensure that a lawyer 
would be present at a postindictment lineup; it was not designed to inform the 
jury about the reliability or “independence” of the memory of an eyewitness who 
picks out the defendant in the courtroom. 
Many federal courts adopt a still more dated approach, relying on instructions 
from the D.C. Circuit’s 1972 decision in United States v. Telfaire,92 which was 
a kind of precursor to the Manson reliability test. Others have pattern 
instructions that refer to the Manson reliability test but modify the test in 
important respects. For example, the Third Circuit’s eyewitness instruction 
states (although I note that a revision to these instructions has been 
recommended by a Third Circuit Task Force):93 “you should ask whether the 
witness was able to observe and had an adequate opportunity to observe the 
person who committed the crime charged.”94 However, the instructions then list 
factors such as “whether the witness was under stress while observing the person 
who committed the crime” and “whether the witness and the person committing 
the crime were of different races.”95 The instructions also cite to witness 
certainty and state “you should ask whether the witness is positive in the 
identification and whether the witness’ testimony remained positive and 
unqualified after cross-examination.”96 Some federal courts also rely on the 
factors set out in Manson in deciding whether to give the jury expanded Telfaire 
jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence.97 Oddly enough, their 
 
that you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the in-Court identification was 
independant [sic] of the previous pre-trial identification or, if not derived from an independent 
source, you must find from other evidence in the case that the defendant is the guilty person 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
91 See Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 449, 494 (2012). 
92 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
93 Press Release, Joel McHugh, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Third Circuit 
Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications Releases Its Report and Best-Practice 
Recommendations (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Eyewitness 
%20ID%20TF_%20Press%20Release%202019%20Report_012720.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Z49-FGNG]. 
94 COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL 




97 See, e.g., United States v. Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30, 31-32 (9th Cir. 1976) (considering “corroborating evidence” in 
finding that lower court did not err in declining to “give special jury instructions proposed by 
[defendant] on eyewitness identification”); see also Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558-59. Some 
federal courts follow that approach, providing district courts with discretion to not employ the 
instructions should they conclude that based on “strong reliability”—assessed using the Neil 
v. Biggers/Manson factors—no such instruction is necessary. United States v. Luis, 835 F.2d 
37, 41 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)). 
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reasoning seems to be that the Manson test provides a “reliability” framework 
for deciding whether to offer additional instructions that convey somewhat 
different information to jurors.98 There is nothing about that test that is based on 
empirical research concerning reliability of eyewitness evidence; the Justices 
crafted the test by drawing from prior case law on admissibility. 
In contrast, courts do not currently appear to rely on the Manson test when 
deciding whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness evidence in a criminal 
case. The overwhelming trend in state and federal courts in recent years has been 
to permit judges to admit such expert evidence.99 However, in the past, some 
state courts did cite to the Manson test as a reason not to approve use of experts 
on eyewitness identifications, noting that if an identification was sufficiently 
“reliable” to admit, then no expert opinion was necessary.100  
Such rulings provide another example of courts mistakenly treating a 
constitutional floor as a ceiling. Indeed, the Supreme Court justified not 
revisiting the Manson test in its 2012 ruling in Perry v. New Hampshire101 by 
noting that state evidence law can more directly address reliability concerns for 
both expert testimony and “[e]yewitness-specific jury instructions.”102 It is truly 
ironic that the Supreme Court failed to address reliability concerns because it 
treated the subject as a matter for state evidence law while some state courts 
have refused to address reliability concerns because they see the federal 
constitutional test as governing. Trial courts can rely on evidence law to 
supplement a constitutional test, and they should do so more often in recognition 
that a constitutional right may serve a narrower evidentiary purpose. Courts 
should not engage in rote repetition of language from a Supreme Court decision 
that concerned admissibility and included factors not designed to be an exclusive 
list—certainly not when instructing jurors when considering whether to admit 
the testimony of an expert or when considering admissibility as a matter of state 
evidence law. In several different settings, lower courts extended the Manson 
 
98 Luis, 835 F.2d at 41-42. 
99 Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 792 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting per se ban on use of 
eyewitness expert evidence and describing how forty-four states, the District of Columbia, 
and “all or nearly all federal circuits”—excluding only one—now permit expert testimony on 
eyewitness evidence). 
100 See, e.g., State v. Outing, 3 A.3d 1, 21 (Conn. 2010) (finding eyewitness expert 
testimony at issue inadmissible and noting that “the proper use of this expert testimony calls 
into question the soundness of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. 
Biggers,” which includes reliability factors subsequently adopted in Manson). But see State 
v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731 n.33 (Conn. 2012) (rejecting reasoning in Outing and noting 
that admissibility of expert testimony raises different issues than admissibility of eyewitness 
evidence itself). 
101 565 U.S. 228 (2012). 
102 Id. at 246 (noting existence of state-law “safeguards” in some states, including 
opportunity for defendant to present expert testimony on hazards of eyewitness identification 
evidence and availability of “[e]yewitness-specific jury instructions, which many . . . state 
courts have adopted, [and which] likewise warn the jury to take care in appraising 
identification evidence” (footnote omitted)). 
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test in unintended ways to limit remedies for potentially unreliable eyewitness 
evidence in criminal cases.103 Given how much we now know about reliability 
concerns with such evidence, the misplacement of due process precedent is 
extremely troubling.  
B. Punitive Damages: Instructing the Jury on Appellate Guideposts 
The Supreme Court’s due process regulation of punitive damages formally 
applies posttrial to require that unconstitutionally excessive verdicts be 
reduced.104 As in the examples just discussed, however, the Court’s due process 
test has taken hold during civil trials in a manner that may not have been intended 
by the Justices. Beginning with its earliest decisions regulating punitive damages 
under the Due Process Clause, the Court expressed great deference to state 
judges’ instructions to jurors. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,105 
the Court approved instructions that dissenters called “scarcely better than no 
guidance at all.”106 The opinion focused on due process standards for postverdict 
review, including the use of guideposts to assess whether punitive damages 
awards are arbitrarily excessive.107 The Court certainly gave directions that 
suggest methods of keeping such verdicts within bounds, but it did not provide 
guidance on how to avoid prejudicing jurors when presenting them with 
evidence of conduct outside the jurisdiction.108 The Court’s standards are chiefly 
designed to govern appeals; for example, the suggestion that a punitive damages 
verdict should be no more than a single-digit multiple of the compensatory 
damage award is a yardstick for appellate courts, not a calculator for the jurors 
to use.109  
To be sure, the Court’s decisions in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell110 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams111 do urge that jurors be 
instructed on not punishing defendants for out-of-state conduct or conduct 
harming nonparty victims. As the Court put it in Philip Morris: “[T]he Due 
Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the 
wrong question . . . .”112 Such rulings were intended to affect trial deliberations. 
 
103 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
104 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-24 (1991). 
105 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
106 Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
107 See id. at 22 (majority opinion). 
108 See id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This jury-like verdict provides 
no guidance as to whether any other procedures are sufficiently ‘reasonable,’ and thus 
perpetuates the uncertainty that our grant of certiorari in this case was intended to resolve.”). 
109 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
110 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
111 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
112 Id. at 355. The State Farm ruling provided guidance that jurors should be instructed 
that out-of-state conduct should not be used as a basis for punitive damages. State Farm, 538 
U.S. at 422. The Philip Morris ruling stated that it would be “standardless” and impermissible 
for a jury to “permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim.” Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 
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However, nothing in rulings concerning guideposts suggests that jurors be 
provided with them during deliberations. 
Many states have long retained general and minimal instructions on the 
subject of punitive damages. Indeed, although some states have revised their 
instructions since State Farm to provide more detailed instructions on the 
subject, many others have not.113 Even some federal courts retain traditional 
punitive damages jury instructions. For example, the Ninth Circuit pattern 
instructions simply state: “If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, you 
must use reason in setting the amount.”114 The Ninth Circuit has noted that the 
due process inquiry “is markedly different from the jury’s determination of a 
specific amount of punitive damages; its purpose is to aid in ascertaining the 
constitutional ceiling. Unlike the initial damage calculation, determining the 
constitutional ceiling on a punitive damage award is a question of law, properly 
reserved for the court.”115 The Ninth Circuit added that, “[a]lthough states are 
certainly free to incorporate the reasonable relationship concept into jury 
instructions, it is also constitutionally permissible . . . to delay the reasonable 
relationship inquiry until the judge’s post-verdict review.”116  
In contrast, some states have taken the hint from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions and adopted substantive due process yardsticks as at least a 
discretionary part of their instructions to the jury. In Illinois, for example, “[t]he 
amount of punitive damages must be reasonable [and in proportion to the actual 
 
354; see also Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive 
Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 498-524 (2004); 
Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instruction on Punitive 
Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 307, 315-20 (2008) 
(explaining gaps in jury instructions and proposing that instructions should be more detailed). 
113 For an excellent in-depth analysis, see Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 112, at 470-
86 (noting that ten states maintain minimal jury instructions, eight more states and the District 
of Columbia adding only consideration of defendant’s wealth, and twenty-eight states 
providing multiple-factor instructions); and Vidmar & Wolfe, supra note 112, at 316-18 
(describing issues with jury instructions, including lack of detail and undefined terms). Some 
states retain largely traditional instructions with modest additions noting that punitive 
damages must be “proportionate” to the actual harm. See, e.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 2:278 (2019) (adding caveats 
regarding out-of-state conduct and injury to third parties in response to State Farm and Phillip 
Morris). Some states have enacted statutes capping punitive damages, providing for specific 
instructions, or a combination of the two. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (West 
2020) (limiting punitive damage awards to greater of $100,000 or amount of actual damages 
awarded). 
114 NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 5.5 (2020), 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil_Instructions 
_2020_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRP3-RN22]. 
115 White v. Ford Motor Co., 500 F.3d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
116 Id. (citation omitted). 
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and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff].”117 “Whether the bracketed 
language concerning ‘proportionality’ should be included in the instruction 
should be decided on a case by case basis”;118 it is neither mandated nor 
prohibited by State Farm or Illinois law.  
Here, the array of responses by state and federal courts to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions should not be surprising. The Court has been intervening in an area 
traditionally defined by common-law standards and, more recently, the subject 
of specific state legislation and jury instructions. The Court has not been clear 
whether its due process concerns extend to jury instructions, as opposed to 
appellate review, except on two discrete subjects—out-of-state conduct and 
harm to third parties. The Court has been understandably reluctant to craft an 
entire set of more detailed instructions in an area where jurors traditionally had 
broad discretion. Indeed, Justices remain unsure whether improved jury 
instructions will adequately constrain juries or whether a numerical constraint 
posttrial does the job better. For example, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,119 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, noted that the Justices, having read 
examples of ill-defined state jury instructions on punitive damages, have become 
“skeptical that verbal formulations, superimposed on general jury instructions, 
are the best insurance against unpredictable outliers.”120 Justice Souter found 
“obvious” the similarity to the goals of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the 
comparative merits of a “quantified approach.”121 To some, the comparison with 
experience under the Sentencing Guidelines would instead provide more of a 
cautionary tale for attempts to quantify punishment. Such a comparison begged 
the question why the Court is authorized to impose specific caps or ratios, which 
are “typically imposed by legislatures, not courts.”122  
The Supreme Court moved in two directions at once, both tightening 
postverdict limits on the amount of punitive damages and limiting the subjects 
about which the jury may be instructed. Regardless of whether the Court’s 
approach is advisable, it increasingly touches on matters of policy and the 
specifics of the implementation of that policy. As a result, if the Court intends 
to continue to intervene in this area and fashion a highly specific due process 
mechanism for regulating punitive damages awards, the Court will have to 
engage with evidentiary issues in far more detail.123 
 
117 ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN 




119 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
120 Id. at 504. 
121 Id. Justice Stevens dissented as to the “empirical judgments” expressed in that portion 
of the opinion. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
122 Id. at 520 (noting that majority could not point to any state court that imposed particular 
ratio). 
123 For one scholar’s prediction that the Court may, for the time being, have 
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C. Miranda: Instructing the Jury on Prophylactic Rights 
The well-known Miranda warnings that inform a suspect of their Fifth 
Amendment rights prior to a custodial interrogation were not intended to provide 
rules of evidence to guide jurors in their understanding of how to evaluate a 
confession.124 Instead, “[r]equiring Miranda warnings before custodial 
interrogation,” the Supreme Court has explained, “provides ‘practical 
reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right.”125 Nevertheless, some 
prominent jurisdictions instruct jurors on compliance with Miranda. The New 
York pattern jury instructions state: 
 Initially, under our law, before a person in custody may be questioned 
by the police [or an assistant district attorney], that person first, must be 
advised of his/her rights; second, must understand those rights; and third, 
must voluntarily waive those rights and agree to speak to the police [or an 
assistant district attorney]. 
 . . . . 
Before you may consider as evidence a statement made by the defendant 
in response to questioning, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was advised of his/her rights, understood those rights, and 
voluntarily waived those rights and agreed to speak to the police [or an 
assistant district attorney]. If you do not make those findings, then you must 
disregard the statement and not consider it.126 
Other major jurisdictions do the same.127 The New Jersey model charge asks 
“whether or not the statement was actually made by the defendant, and, if made, 
whether the statement or any portion of it is credible.”128 The New Jersey model 
charge then directs the courts to discuss the proof presented before the jury that 
relates to the defendant’s Miranda rights or the voluntariness of their 
 
“unceremoniously” ended this era of regulating punitive damages awards, see generally Jim 
Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for 
Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525 (2011). 
124 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). 
125 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
126 COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEW YORK CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
STATEMENTS (ADMISSIONS, CONFESSIONS) 6-7 (2019) [hereinafter NEW YORK CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS] (first, second, and fourth alterations in original), http://www.nycourts.gov 
/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Confession.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J9U-EUB5]. 
127 Texas has a general jury instruction that instructs the jury on the voluntariness of 
confessions, and at least one case assumes that it permits Miranda-related instructions. TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 7 (West 2019) (“When the issue [of voluntariness of a 
statement made by an accused] is raised by the evidence, the trial judge shall appropriately 
instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such statement.”); Estrada v. State, 313 
S.W.3d 274, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing whether defendant was entitled to 
“validity of Miranda waiver” instruction pursuant to Article 38.22 § 7). 
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statements.129 Other jurisdictions do not do so. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) 
provides in part: “[T]he trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence 
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to 
the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.”130  
Now, a judge or model instructions committee may simply be looking for 
factors relevant to an assessment of the voluntariness of a confession. Indeed, 
states may even desire to overprotect federal constitutional rights using their 
own evidence rules. Some states have rejected proposed jury instructions on the 
question whether the defendant had been given Miranda warnings; the concern 
seems to be that the defendant may be trying to relitigate whether Miranda was 
violated and to “comment on the weight of the evidence.”131 In a Massachusetts 
case, it was the defendant who proposed, and the trial judge who accepted, a jury 
instruction explaining: “When the police take a person into custody, they give 
him certain warnings before any statements he makes in response to 
interrogation will be admissible in evidence. You have probably heard of them; 
they are called Miranda warnings.”132 Having lost the suppression hearing, the 
defendant may have hoped that the jury would still view the Mirandized 
statements as involuntary. One reason states have bent over backwards to 
instruct jurors on confessions, including on Miranda—even though it is not a 
rule designed to inform evaluation of the evidence—may be that the Supreme 
Court has strongly emphasized how important it is that a jury not consider 
involuntary confessions. The Court has emphasized that, for example, “[a] trial 
judge has a powerful tool at his disposal to protect the constitutional privilege—
the jury instruction” and that when a defendant is silent, “[n]o judge can prevent 
jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute in the face of a 
criminal accusation, but a judge can, and must, if requested to do so, use the 
unique power of the jury instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum.”133  
The use of Miranda in jury instructions, however, may not be more protective. 
Consider how the fact that a defendant did waive Miranda rights may only 
highlight that this was an informed and voluntary confession which followed the 
 
129 Id. 
130 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2018). Compare this Washington state instruction: “You may give 
such weight and credibility to any alleged out-of-court statements of the defendant as you see 
fit, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances.” WA. STATE SUPREME COURT 
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL 
§ 6.41 (2016), https://govt.westlaw.com/wcrji/Document/Ief9e3bc7e10d11daade1ae871 
d9b2cbe?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=Category
PageItem&contextData=(sc.Default) [https://perma.cc/L6GZ-FNBR]. 
131 Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc) (ruling that 
trial court properly excluded proposed instructions reciting specific facts and evidence 
relating to voluntariness). 
132 Commonwealth v. Stone, 877 N.E.2d 620, 627 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (outlining 
defendant’s argument on appeal that trial judge’s acceptance of defendant’s proposed 
instruction created substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because instruction suggested 
that defendant had been under arrest at time of statement). 
133 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981). 
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waiver. If the defendant did invoke Fifth Amendment rights after receiving 
Miranda warnings, unless some exception applied (such as the use of such 
statements to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial),134 the confession 
would presumably not be before the jury. The instructions will therefore chiefly 
be used to highlight waivers of Miranda rights. The Supreme Court may not 
have intended a waiver of Miranda rights to serve as additional evidence that 
the confession that followed was in fact a voluntary one. But that is the use that 
Miranda may be put to (and it can be put to that use more commonly and 
informally when officers emphasize on the stand that they gave all of the 
required warnings to the suspect prior to securing a confession statement). While 
few criminal cases result in a trial, and the effect of Miranda during 
interrogations themselves is a separate and contested question, this account 
suggests that rules designed to serve one remedial purpose may be repurposed 
by lower courts.  
Constitutional rulings are seen as relatively risk-free sources for inclusion in 
jury instructions. If a judge instructing a jury or a committee drafting model jury 
instructions is seeking language to underscore a point, what could be more 
authoritative than quoting the Supreme Court? This may not be an impermissible 
or completely unanticipated use of constitutional doctrine, but these examples 
do suggest that the process by which constitutional doctrine filters into practice 
in the trial courts remains underexamined. 
That said, while holding that the defendant may present to the jury 
circumstances surrounding the voluntariness of a confession, the Supreme Court 
has not encouraged—much less required—judges to instruct jurors regarding the 
voluntariness of confessions.135 The Court in Lego v. Twomey136 emphasized 
instead that the voluntariness hearing before the judge, using a preponderance 
of the evidence standard of proof, is sufficient to determine the confession’s 
admissibility, citing to “the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a 
question for the court rather than the jury.”137 Federal courts, following 18 
 
134 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (“The shield provided by Miranda 
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of 
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”). Thus, when “Miranda-defective 
statements” are introduced for impeachment, California jury instructions appropriately 
require the trial judge to instruct the jury: “You may not consider it as proof that the statement 
is true or for any other purpose.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 356 (2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov 
/partners/documents/calcrim_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2QQ-AP8J]. 
135 See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972). 
136 404 U.S. 477 (1972). 
137 Id. at 490; see also id. at 485-86, 486 n.14 (noting that defendant may present 
circumstances surrounding taking of confession to jury (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2018))). 
§ 3501(a) provides: 
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, 
a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, 
out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge 
 
2020] MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2111 
U.S.C. § 3501(a), only minimally instruct the jury concerning a confession; the 
jurors are told to “give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves 
under all the circumstances.”138 State courts need not adhere to that statute, and 
nothing in the Court’s rulings forbids states from providing more detailed 
guidance concerning the manner in which to weigh confession evidence or 
postarrest statements. Few state courts, however, have departed from the bare 
minimum of no voluntariness instruction required by the Court.139  
 
determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and 
the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness 
and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it 
deserves under all the circumstances. 
138 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a); see also, e.g., COMM. ON FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 
§ 3.09 (2019) http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/Pattern_Criminal_Jury 
_Instructions_2012ed_includes_2015-2019_changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4D6-LBU4] 
(“You must decide whether [the defendant; defendant [name]] actually made the statement 
and, if so, how much weight to give to the statement. In making these decisions, you should 
consider all of the evidence, including the defendant’s personal characteristics and 
circumstances under which the statement may have been made.” (alterations in original)); 
NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 4.1 (2020) [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL] 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/355 [https://perma.cc/6TEG-L8HC] 
(“It is for you to decide (1) whether the defendant made the statement, and (2) if so, how much 
weight to give to it. In making those decisions, you should consider all the evidence about the 
statement, including the circumstances under which the defendant may have made it.”). 
139 See, e.g., MICH. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 82, § 4.1(3) (“If you find that the 
defendant did make the statement, you may give the statement whatever weight you think it 
deserves. In deciding this, you should think about how and when the statement was made, and 
about all the other evidence in the case. You may consider the statement in deciding the facts 
of the case [and in deciding if you believe the defendant’s testimony in court].” (alteration in 
original)). Some states cite to Lego as a reason not to adopt more detailed instructions on 
voluntariness. See, e.g., NEVADA MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
CONFESSION/ADMISSION 22-23 (on file with the Boston University Law Review) 
(“Voluntariness is based on the totality of circumstances, no one factor being controlling. If 
you decide that a statement was made voluntarily, then you may consider it in determining 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant making the statement.” (citing, inter alia, Lego, 404 
U.S. 477)). Other states do provide expanded instructions regarding voluntariness. See, e.g., 
N.H. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS DRAFTING COMM., CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTION ON CONFESSIONS OR ADMISSIONS 14 (Draft 2010) 
http://nhba.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/14150801/CJI.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DKW-4QXZ] (“The basic test is whether the police exerted such an 
influence over the defendant that [his] [her] will was overborne. In making this decision, you 
should consider all of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s statements, including 
the time and place the [confession] [admissions] occurred, the length of time the defendant 
was questioned, and the physical and mental condition of the defendant. You may also 
consider the age, education, experience, character and intelligence of the defendant to the 
extent that you have heard such evidence.” (alterations in original)); NEW YORK CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 126, at 9. 
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Now that many more state statutes require videotaping of interrogations, more 
states have added certain additional cautionary jury instructions should not 
follow a rule requiring recording of interrogations.140 Perhaps, after many 
decades of giving the traditional and minimal instructions endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Lego, we may start to see more experimentation in the 
states.141 That Supreme Court rulings not intended to regulate police conduct 
may have stifled such experimentation, though, provides an important 
cautionary tale. 
D. Civil Causation and Criminal Materiality Standards 
A range of constitutional criminal procedure rights include a materiality 
standard designed to ensure that during appellate review—or, more typically, 
post-conviction review—a court does not grant relief unless the error had an 
adequate effect on the criminal verdict at trial. For example, the Brady v. 
Maryland142 rule contains that requirement; it is not enough that prosecutors 
concealed exculpatory evidence at trial; the petitioner must also show that this 
evidence was material.143 A civil case asserting a Brady violation can only be 
brought after a conviction is vacated.144 At that phase, however, the context is 
now a post-conviction review of a final criminal conviction; the conviction has 
been overturned. I have argued elsewhere that, given this procedural posture, the 
materiality requirement is not applicable.145 Instead, under § 1983, the question 
is whether the Brady violation caused a constitutional violation.146 Nevertheless, 
 
140 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4505(1) (2016) (“If a defendant testifies contrary to his 
or her statement made during a custodial interrogation at a place of detention which was not 
electronically recorded, such statement may be used for the purpose of impeachment if it is 
shown that the statement was freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.”); WIS. 
STAT. § 972.115(2)(a) (2018) (“If a statement made by a defendant during a custodial 
interrogation is admitted into evidence in a trial for a felony before a jury and if an audio or 
audio and visual recording of the interrogation is not available, . . . the court shall instruct the 
jury that it is the policy of this state to make an audio or audio and visual recording of a 
custodial interrogation of a person suspected of committing a felony and that the jury may 
consider the absence of an audio or audio and visual recording of the interrogation in 
evaluating the evidence relating to the interrogation and the statement in the case . . . .”); 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 534 (Mass. 2004) (“[T]he jury should 
also be advised that the absence of a recording permits (but does not compel) them to conclude 
that the Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
141 For a discussion of social science–informed reliability review of confession evidence, 
including through the use of expanded jury instructions, see Brandon L. Garrett, 
Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 399-419, 429-31 (2015). 
142 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
143 Id. at 87; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defining material 
evidence as that which creates “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). 
144 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 
145 Garrett, supra note 55, at 69-75. 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
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some federal courts have applied a “materiality and prejudice” standard, distinct 
from the civil causation standard, both in rulings on pretrial motions and in jury 
instructions, telling the jury that they must find a “reasonable probability” that 
the result of criminal proceedings would have been different if evidence had 
been disclosed.147 They have, in my view, mistakenly imported a criminal post-
conviction standard into a civil setting. 
III. MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON EXECUTIVES  
The prior Part focused on the unintended application of constitutional rules to 
the wrong procedural settings, such as in jury instructions or in the determination 
the admissibility of evidence at trial. This Part turns to the influence of such 
rulings on the wrong government actors, looking at when executive actors 
incorporate rules designed to limit remedies in civil cases to their own policies 
for executive conduct or for bringing criminal cases. All government officials 
should of course be carefully attentive to constitutional limits on their actions. 
However, they also should not treat constitutional floors as ceilings that they 
cannot improve upon by developing their own practices. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has often been explicit that agencies are free to adopt their own policies 
and should do so to supplement the constitutional floor. I also describe how the 
Court may have intended to influence police behavior in the Fifth Amendment 
context post-Miranda, but I note that the effort has not been successful. 
A. Fourth Amendment Rulings and Police Use-of-Force Policies 
One place in which executive actors often adopt constitutional floors as 
ceilings is police use of force. There is a still more troubling aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity rulings: they have impacted decision-
making by police and prosecutors in other contexts. Those civil qualified 
immunity rulings have impacted prosecutors when deciding whether to 
criminally prosecute police for using deadly force. Timothy McGinty, in 
deciding not to prosecute the officer who shot Tamir Rice, cited extensively to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,148 a 
case finding that officers benefitted from qualified immunity.149 To the extent 
that the Court in Sheehan made statements regarding police tactics and not 
judging police with “the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” those statements mixed the 
standard for judging force under the Fourth Amendment with the qualified 
immunity standards designed to protect “competent officers” from civil 
litigation, including litigation based solely on providing “an expert’s report” on 
whether the officer’s use of force was advisable.150 Such concern with the 
 
147 See, e.g., Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissing Brady claim 
because suppressed evidence was not material and not “sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome” (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678)); see also Garrett, supra note 55, at 72. 
148 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). 
149 See CUYAHOGA REPORT, supra note 18, at 39 (citing Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1765). 
150 Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777 (quoting Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
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burdens of defending civil litigation, the uses of summary judgment, and the role 
of expert reports in civil litigation, all detailed in the Sheehan decision, should 
play no role when considering whether an officer committed a state crime.  
More broadly, many prosecutors rely on civil Fourth Amendment case law 
when deciding whether to prosecute an officer for the use of force. As Seth 
Stoughton has put it: “The constitutional/non-constitutional and criminal/non-
criminal lines are totally distinct here,” and yet they have often been “very 
casually” imported from one context to the other.151 For federal officers, there is 
undoubtedly a separate and important Supremacy Clause concern in ensuring 
that federal law and institutions are insulated from state interference.152 
Executive actors are not constrained by civil Fourth Amendment case law when 
applying state criminal statutes and nor should they be, except to the extent that 
they must comply with the constitutional floor. While they may not cite to the 
Constitution disingenuously, they are not in fact bound to remain on the 
constitutional floor.  
To be sure, executive actors can have a great deal of discretion. It may not be 
a legal error for such actors to rely on constitutional law in the sense that a court 
may use a standard in the wrong way as in the examples discussed. Nor do 
executive actors necessarily have to justify the exercise of their discretion; 
prosecutors do not have to justify their charging decisions, and police agencies 
can adopt the policies that they think are the most valuable in their patrol guides 
so long as they follow the constitutional minima. However, to the extent that 
actors adopt policies with reference to constitutional standards, I view it as 
problematic to cite to standards that do not necessarily apply in that setting 
without some further justification. Thus, if a prosecutor justified citing to a civil 
Fourth Amendment standard by emphasizing that even more than that would be 
required to justify a criminal prosecution, then perhaps that would be a sensible 
explanation for the usage. If an officer relies on constitutional authority that is 
not in fact applicable in a setting, then that officer has not properly justified a 
decision. The officer may have discretion, and there may not be a way to legally 
challenge the decision, but it should nevertheless be treated as suspect if there is 
a context in which it can be reviewed. 
B. Miranda and Police Policy 
The misuse of the Miranda standard at trial may be a symptom of a larger and 
understandable confusion regarding how that standard applies during police 
 
151 Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Killer Went Free Because of the “Reasonableness Test.” 
It Didn’t Have To Be That Way., SLATE (Dec. 31, 2015, 2:18 PM), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2015/12/the-legal-reason-tamir-rices-killer-wasn-t-prosecuted.html 
[https://perma.cc/FS2A-LS94]; see also Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police Use of 
Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years After Garner, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 126 
(2015) (“The standards for criminal liability in a state criminal prosecution do not have to 
mimic the standards for a constitutional tort.”). 
152 For an excellent discussion, see generally Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, 
What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 
112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003). 
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interrogations. The Supreme Court’s rulings in the Miranda context and in 
related Fifth Amendment contexts make it difficult for law enforcement not only 
to sensibly follow Miranda itself but also to adopt a coherent body of best 
practices that might improve upon the constitutional floor. Where the Court does 
so, it is harder to identify a clearly misplaced use of constitutional doctrine; the 
Court may very well be trying to regulate, or at least influence, executive actors. 
In such situations, police agencies are free to move beyond the constitutional 
framework set out in Supreme Court decisions and supplement it with their own 
rules and approaches. It is not a misplacement, or clearly wrong, for executive 
actors to adhere to the constitutional floor, so long as they choose to do so. A 
reflexive adherence, due to mistaken understanding or lack of realization that 
they can build on that floor, however, would be more troubling. Over time, 
agencies may increasingly depart from the constitutional floor if it is not 
informative. That has occurred in the interrogation context, as is discussed 
below. One reason for this departure may be due to a genuine concern that false 
confessions can result from following an approach that unduly permits 
uninformed and coercive interrogations. However, for other agencies, another 
reason to adopt improved practices may have been that those constitutional 
rulings have become so complex and incoherent that the system is not worth 
gaming. 
The Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances test 
does not provide useful guidance to law enforcement, creating a body of law that 
is both in tension with the Miranda ruling and difficult to follow. The rulings 
suggest that, absent a suspect deemed to be in custody, no regulation or guidance 
is necessary for police. Yet what “custody” entails is often hard to predict or 
understand. Thus, in rulings such as Salinas v. Texas,153 the Supreme Court has 
been highly tolerant of police questioning of individuals deemed not to be in 
“custody” without providing Miranda warnings and the accompanying 
constitutional protections.154 
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment “voluntariness” test 
provides a remedy for undue coercion during custodial interrogations.155 
However, that test is multifactored and highly case specific, and it does not 
provide clear guidance to law enforcement.156 Courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of, for example, extremely lengthy interrogations.157 Indeed, 
 
153 570 U.S. 178 (2013) (plurality opinion). 
154 Id. at 181 (affirming judgment against defendant where defendant was not in custody, 
did not receive Miranda warnings, and did not invoke right against self-incrimination). 
155 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991) (remanding case for new trial at which 
confession is not admitted as evidence when confession was coerced by threat of violence). 
156 Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the 
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015). 
157 Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 
2046-47 (1998) (discussing effect of lengthy interrogations on voluntariness of confessions 
and citing cases in which courts have nonetheless upheld interrogations lasting nine or more 
hours). 
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the Supreme Court has itself noted that the voluntariness test does not provide 
clear guidance to law enforcement. In Dickerson, it stated that “the totality-of-
the-circumstances test . . . is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement 
officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”158 Or as 
the Court put it far earlier in Haynes v. Washington,159 “The line between proper 
and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due 
process is, at best, a difficult one to draw . . . .”160 
The Court has said that “[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an 
accused is advised of and understands the right to remain silent and the right to 
counsel,” and the Miranda rule can be said to provide a simple rule of decision 
for police: provide the warnings or be deprived of the use of statements that 
follow the police questioning.161 Rather than retain a simple rule to guide police, 
though, the Court has held that a waiver of rights may be “implied” from silence, 
even after several hours of a suspect remaining silent in the face of police 
questioning.162 The Court has permitted “a good-faith Miranda mistake” to 
excuse an officer’s failure to provide the warnings in a departure from prior 
rulings that typically imposed an objective standard of care upon officers.163 The 
standards and distinctions in this area of law are complex. Barry Friedman has 
described these rulings as “stealth overruling,” where without explicitly 
overruling it, the Court’s subsequent rulings do not appear faithful to the 
Miranda decision.164 These complex rulings create opportunities for gaming the 
system rather than providing law enforcement with a clear set of best practices 
for interviews and interrogations. 
The concern shared by many scholars is that the result of this case law was to 
encourage police agencies to adopt the constitutional baseline which permits the 
flouting of Miranda and related Fifth Amendment law by making use of 
exceptions and by generally deemphasizing Miranda warnings, making them 
seem like an irrelevant afterthought in order to see that such warnings are 
disregarded by the subject.165  
 
158 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
159 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
160 Id. at 515. 
161 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010). 
162 Id. at 384 (“Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 
‘the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct 
indicating waiver.’” (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979))). 
163 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Although the Elstad 
Court expressed no explicit conclusion about either officer’s state of mind, it is fair to read 
Elstad as treating the . . . conversation as a good-faith Miranda mistake, not only open to 
correction by careful warnings before systematic questioning . . . , but posing no threat to 
warn-first practice generally.” (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985))). 
164 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16-25 (2010). 
165 Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ 
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433-39 
(1999). 
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Commonly used interrogation tactics themselves seem to violate the spirit of 
this case law. American police interrogators long used the so-called “Reid 
Method.”166 “[This] method emphasizes a set of psychological techniques 
designed to confront and accuse a suspect, and then maximize the pressure 
placed on the suspect to incriminate themselves, while appearing to minimize 
the consequences for the suspect in doing so.”167 The techniques tend to rely on 
“some form of deception,” ranging from “rationalization” of the person’s actions 
to outright “evidence fabrication.”168 Perhaps, though, the Supreme Court over 
time, in “stealth overruling” Miranda, used its rulings to encourage agencies to 
adopt such approaches. The Court’s rulings may have tacitly encouraged highly 
coercive interrogation tactics. If so, then this was not the Court standing by as 
its constitutional rulings were misapplied. Instead, the Court intended and 
encouraged police use of its more recent rulings (like those creating exceptions 
to Miranda) to replace reliance on its older rulings like Miranda. 
However, the story is more complex still because the Supreme Court may not 
have accomplished what it intended. Arguably due to the confusing guidance 
provided by the more recent decisions, the message they have sent may have 
been lost on policing agencies. Traditional interrogation methods have been 
evolving in the United States; Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates, perhaps the 
leading interrogation training provider, no longer trains on the Reid Method.169 
The federal High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (“HIG”), which includes 
members of the CIA, FBI, and other federal law enforcement, has developed 
interrogation best practices that similarly focus on questioning that is designed 
to build rapport and “draw out what the detainee knows as opposed to only 
focusing on [what] the intelligence the team would like to obtain.”170 “Police 
departments, including in Dallas, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, have begun to 
use the approach developed by the HIG.”171 Recording police interrogations, an 
approach neither encouraged nor discouraged by federal constitutional rulings, 
has become extremely common; it has been voluntarily adopted by police 
 
166 FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 339-50 (5th ed. 2013) (discussing Reid Method on how to 
distinguish between true and false confessions). 
167 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: POLICING § 11.01, at 104 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2019). 
168 Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After 
Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1157, 1160-61 (2017). 
169 Eli Hager, The Seismic Change in Police Interrogations, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 7, 
2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/07/the-seismic-change-in-
police-interrogations [https://perma.cc/SX3V-6J37]. 
170 HIGH-VALUE DETAINEE INTERROGATION GRP., INTERROGATION BEST PRACTICES 2 
(2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/hig-report-august-2016.pdf/view 
[https://perma.cc/S5FC-UVAJ]. 
171 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: POLICING § 11.01, at 104 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2019). 
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agencies, required or encouraged by model policies, required by state statutes, 
and required or encouraged by state court rulings.172 
The Supreme Court may have nudged its constitutional floor in the direction 
of a ceiling,173 but over time that effort may have failed. Increasingly, police 
agencies and state court rulings nevertheless treat those rulings as a floor that 
they should build upon. In that way, the experience of the adoption and 
nonadoption of constitutional law concerning police interrogations is a hopeful 
one. Over time, executive actors can learn from their experience in using 
constitutional rules and can make more informed decisions about whether and 
how to rely upon those constitutional rules. 
C. Eyewitness Identification Procedure 
In the jury instruction area, state courts, police agencies, and lawmakers in 
recent years have increasingly stepped away from the Manson decision when 
crafting reformed jury instructions and police practices in the area of eyewitness 
identifications. They have (correctly in my opinion) come to the view that the 
constitutional rule is only a floor and not a ceiling. In doing so, they have cited 
to more recent scientific research as a reason to revise or update the manner in 
which the judge explains the “reliability” of an eyewitness identification to the 
jury.174 As the National Academy of Sciences has put it: “The best guidance for 
legal regulation of eyewitness identification evidence comes not . . . from 
constitutional rulings, but from the careful use and understanding of scientific 
evidence to guide fact-finders and decision-makers.”175  
 
172 Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement 
Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews As Required by Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 228-34 (2009) (listing police departments that employ video recording in 
every state and the District of Columbia); see also Saul M. Kassin, Richard A. Leo, Christian 
A. Meissner, Kimberly D. Richman, Lori H. Colwell, Amy-May Leach & Dana La Fon, 
Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 
31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 382 (2007) (listing observation of taped interrogations as basis 
for empirical study); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: POLICING § 11.02, at 109-12 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019). 
173 Indeed, scholars who are critical of Miranda because they view it as overly regulating 
police and those who believe it did not go nearly far enough agree that moving away from 
Supreme Court case law has been a positive development. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, 
Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 503 (1998) (“To protect the innocent, videotaping of 
police interrogation should be substituted for the Miranda rules.”); Richard A. Leo, Peter J. 
Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession 
Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 
85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 790 (2013) (“Miranda fails to offer any meaningful protection against 
the elicitation of false confessions or the admission of false and unreliable confessions into 
evidence at trial.”). 
174 For a detailed discussion of state jury instructions in this area and their evolution, see 
NRC REPORT, supra note 15, at 40-43. 
175 Id. at 44. 
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The most dramatic shift in any state court occurred in 2011, when the New 
Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Henderson.176 In 
2012, that court released an expanded jury instruction, a new court rule, and a 
revised court rule relating to eyewitness identifications in criminal cases.177 The 
jury instruction contains a highly detailed set of factors that, if implicated in a 
given case, are to be used to explain to jurors how to assess eyewitness 
identification evidence.178 The Oregon Supreme Court in its State v. Lawson179 
decision instead rejected Manson as useful as a matter of state evidence law, 
relying instead on an analysis similar to that under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
to rule that scientific evidence should inform the question of whether an 
eyewitness identification should be excluded as unduly prejudicial or whether 
cautionary instructions are warranted.180 The third state high court to intervene 
has been the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which, in Commonwealth 
v. Gomes,181 recently adopted a far more concise jury instruction that conveys 
similar information about scientific research on eyewitness memory.182 The 
National Academy of Sciences report counseled that more research needs to be 
done to study what types of jury instructions are effective and that use of expert 
testimony is preferable; the report added that, as a second-best alternative, 
judges should provide a concise set of instructions that is easily understandable 
to a jury.183  
A few other courts have rejected the Manson approach in part, making 
piecemeal improvements to their evidentiary rules. The Georgia Supreme Court 
concluded in 2005 that one particular use of the Manson factors was no longer 
to be permitted, stating, “[W]e can no longer endorse an instruction authorizing 
 
176 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011) (modifying framework for evaluating reliability of 
eyewitness testimony based on scientific evidence). 
177 See N.J. CT. R. 3:11 (explaining requirements for out-of-court suspect identification 
procedure); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 (rendering discoverable in a criminal proceeding all records 
related to identification procedures); N.J. COURTS, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES, 
IDENTIFICATION: IN-COURT AND OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS 2-8 (2012) [hereinafter N.J. 
MODEL CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS], https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/criminalcharges 
/idinout.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXK5-WEYA] (setting forth jury charges explaining to jurors 
scientific research on accuracy of memory). 
178 N.J. MODEL CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 177, at 2-8. 
179 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012) (en banc). 
180 Id. at 690-97 (concluding that the Manson framework is inadequate and describing 
revised procedures). 
181 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015). 
182 Id. at 918-27 (setting forth provisional model jury instruction). 
183 See NRC REPORT, supra note 15, at 42-43 (“Expert testimony on eyewitness 
memory . . . appears to have many advantages . . . . However, when expert testimony is not 
available . . . , jury instructions may be a preferable alternative means to inform the jury of 
the findings of scientific research . . . . Brief instructions may not, however, provide sufficient 
guidance to explain the relevant scientific evidence to the jury, but lengthy instructions may 
be cumbersome and complex. More research is warranted to better understand how best to 
communicate to jurors the factors that may affect the validity of eyewitness testimony . . . .”). 
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jurors to consider the witness’s certainty in his/her identification as a factor to 
be used in deciding the reliability of that identification.”184 Other courts have 
done the same, modifying the Manson factors by discarding from jury 
instructions any instruction as to eyewitness confidence or certainty.185 Like the 
Third Circuit, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently endorsed more detailed 
instructions concerning cross-racial identifications, identification under stress, 
the relevance of witness confidence, and use of suggestive identification 
practices.186 
Traditionally, many law enforcement agencies either had policies that were 
decades out of date or had no written policies at all; the brief policies that did 
exist often simply restated federal constitutional law.187 Often, any training that 
these agencies conducted was informal.188 Many agencies had policies that 
largely repeated what the federal due process test states about avoiding undue 
suggestion in lineups.189 As in the interrogation setting, however, that may be 
changing. There is evidence, for example, that model policies can encourage 
agencies to adopt more evidence-informed approaches towards lineups.190 In 
recent years, there is evidence that more police agencies have adopted revised 
eyewitness identification policies.191  
 
184 Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005). 
185 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Payne, 690 N.E.2d 443, 448 (Mass. 1998) (“[W]e recently 
held . . . that language telling the jury to take into account the strength of the identification 
‘should be omitted from the standard instruction concerning eyewitness testimony’ . . . .” 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997))); State v. Romero, 
922 A.2d 693, 703 (N.J. 2007) (“[A] witness’s level of confidence, standing alone, may not 
be an indication of the reliability of the identification.” (emphasis omitted)). 
186 United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[W]e agree 
that . . . information bearing on the effects of stress, witness confidence and cross-racial 
identification would be helpful to the jury in the present case . . . .”). Updated First Circuit 
pattern jury instructions reflecting those additions cited to guidance from the American Bar 
Association and from the Henderson decision in New Jersey. NANCY TORRESEN, U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE, 2019 REVISIONS TO PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 2.22 (2019), 
https://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf/crpjilinks.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW7N-EU6A]. 
187 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS 




188 Michael S. Wogalter, Roy S. Malpass & Dawn E. McQuiston, A National Survey of US 
Police on Preparation and Conduct of Identification Lineups, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 69, 
79 (2004) (finding that, of 220 agencies surveyed, over half reported no formal training on 
eyewitness identification procedures). 
189 Id. 
190 Albright & Garrett, supra note 10, at 52-56 (describing adoption of model policies 
regarding eyewitness evidence in twenty-nine states and the federal government). 
191 Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Virginia Case 
Study, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 18 (2014) (finding that few Virginia law enforcement policies 
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State lawmakers have required that police agencies adopt a series of best 
practices in their identification policies.192 When state statutes are not informed 
by constitutional rules, the drafters may have shied away from permitting clear 
remedies in court since they cannot point to a due process violation requiring 
exclusion if agencies do not comply.193 If so, they should not have been so 
focused on federal constitutional law as a model. 
IV. AVOIDING MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The examples discussed in the previous Part include rules relevant to both 
civil and criminal cases, rules governing judges and executive actors, and rules 
informing lawmakers. The ramifications of each example extend beyond cases 
that go to trial, since they may affect civil settlement and plea bargaining in the 
vast majority of cases that do not proceed to trial. What can better prevent the 
use of constitutional language in evidentiary contexts for which it was not 
intended? I suggest that far more care should be paid both to the interpretation 
of constitutional rights that affect evidence practice and to evidence practice 
itself. What that care means depends on who the actor is; courts may be quite 
constrained to appropriately employ constitutional standards, while executive 
actors may have quite a bit of discretion. It may merely be advisable to correctly 
cite to and explain the use of a constitutional standard. I also describe lessons 
learned from efforts to intentionally use constitutional rules to influence courts 
and executive actors, such as the cautionary post-Miranda story described in 
Part III.  
A. Clear Statement Rules 
One way to address the misplacement problem is to insist that courts more 
clearly state to which actor, procedural setting, or remedy a constitutional right 
is addressed. Such a rule could be seen as a type of clear statement rule. Rather 
than require, say, lawmakers to clearly state whether they seek to achieve a result 
that implicates a constitutional right, this type of rule would require a clear 
statement that an actor intends to rely on constitutional text in a new setting.194 
Courts should explain that a constitutional right is designed with an actor or 
setting or remedy in mind, and they should step in if actors use constitutional 
language in unintended ways. Not only should they make clear statements that 
they intend to displace state or administrative law, but courts should engage in 
 
complied with state model policy on lineup procedures). But see Brandon L. Garrett, Self-
Policing: Dissemination and Adoption of Police Eyewitness Policies in Virginia, 105 VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 96, 109 (2019) (describing widespread adoption of state model policy since 2014 
study). 
192 Albright & Garrett, supra note 10, at 47-52. 
193 Id. at app. A (appendix on file with the Boston University Law Review) (detailing each 
of these state statutes and noting that none requires judicial remedies for violations). 
194 Manning, supra note 73, at 401 (describing such clear statement rules which “insist that 
Congress express itself clearly when it wishes to adopt a policy that presses against a favored 
constitutional value”). 
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careful consideration before awarding deference to or using constitutional rights 
and norms in contexts in which they do not formally apply.  
One challenge is that the constitutional problem is less visible when courts 
claim to be adhering to a constitutional test but are in fact using that test for 
different or even inconsistent purposes. It can seem cautious to rely on 
constitutional text when in doubt. Soliciting briefs on trial and evidentiary 
practice could perhaps better inform such rulings, and lower courts may be better 
able to assess the practical problems posed. Doing this can also create, I have 
suggested, more incentives for lower courts to document rulings and model 
rulings and instructions, creating a record and making it easier for other courts 
to know to what evidentiary uses constitutional rulings are put.195 
When courts or executive actors cite to and rely upon constitutional standards, 
one abiding lesson should be that recitation of constitutional language should 
not be enough. Deference to constitutional law and norms should not be 
automatic when not required or even intended. Careful attention should be paid 
to whether that constitutional test is serving its purpose when extended into a 
new context.  
Thus, when state courts adopt the federal rule for a constitutional right, 
observers should ask whether they should rather have built upon the 
constitutional floor rather than just hewed to the minimum. They are not 
misplacing a constitutional right; the federal minimum does apply, but it does 
not constrain them from doing more. All too often though, states have adopted 
federal standards without serious justification for doing so.196 Similarly, judges, 
when crafting jury instructions or in their own rulings, may parrot a 
constitutional standard rather than considering what standard suits the problem. 
The adoption of a standard by the Supreme Court can simply disincentivize 
government actors from further regulating an area.197 The costs to sound policy 
can be substantial and unintended. 
 
195 See Garrett, supra note 1, at 117. 
196 See, e.g., Chelf v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 515 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) 
(finding that state law supports objective approach to determining whether officer used 
excessive force but deriving standard from Graham v. Connor rather than state law sources); 
Caudillo v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0467, 2010 WL 2146408, at *4 n.6 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. May 27, 2010) (“It appears . . . that [the officer] was ‘effectuating an arrest’ because his 
use of deadly force against Celaya constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.”). 
But see Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 263 (2013) (finding that “state negligence 
law . . . is broader than federal Fourth Amendment law”); SETH W. STOUGHTON, JEFFREY J. 
NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE 70-71 (2020) (“Thirty-
two states, a significant majority, have simply not referenced constitutional law when 
interpreting or applying state law in the context of deadly force . . . .”). 
197 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 793 (2006). 
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B. Common Placement 
The misplacement of constitutional tests, as described in this Article, raises a 
larger question of the use of one line of constitutional interpretation to influence 
another area of doctrine. So-called constitutional “borrowing” may sometimes 
be quite appropriate and desirable, but sometimes is not.198 In some areas, while 
the constitutional text arguably does not cover a different actor, remedy, or 
procedural context, the Supreme Court may have interpreted the right as 
applying in that other setting.  
This type of convergence may not necessarily be problematic at all if similar 
interests are served in the other setting. For example, the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, as noted, has been interpreted as applying to only critical phases of a 
criminal trial.199 However, the Court has ruled that on appeal, there are similar 
due process and equal protection rights to counsel, with similar rights to 
effective assistance of counsel and to representation for an indigent defendant.200 
Similarly, while the right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment applies 
only in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has held that juveniles have a similar 
right in juvenile cases under the due process and equal protection clauses.201 The 
goals of those other amendments may overlap, providing analogous protections. 
Importantly, the Court has been clear that the juveniles’ right to counsel rests on 
different constitutional grounds than the Sixth Amendment, showing how there 
may be different sources for protection in contexts not covered by a certain 
constitutional right. As such, the Court may borrow standards or approaches, but 
it does not formally misplace one standard in a different context. 
That said, even if there is a good reason for a constitutional rule to influence 
a setting in which it is not formally binding, the rule must also be adapted to that 
setting. I have described how the Supreme Court’s post-Miranda rulings are so 
complex that they provide poor guidance to law enforcement. They are not fit 
for that setting because officers require clear policy and training. Similarly, as 
described next, jury instructions may not be well adapted to reflect the types of 
considerations that inform constitutional rights, since they are typically designed 
to inform jurors about the type and weight of evidence they should consider and 
not whether a person’s rights were violated. 
 
198 See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 
467-71 (2010) (juxtaposing benefits of constitutional borrowing with risks thereof, such as 
creating legal discordance). 
199 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). 
200 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617-24 (2005); Martinez v. Court of Appeal, Fourth 
Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 155 (2000) (“The right to counsel on appeal stems from the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth 
Amendment . . . .” (quoting People v. Scott, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1998))). 
201 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57 (1967) (“[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of 
delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the 
absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance 
with our law and constitutional requirements.”). 
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C. Rethinking Jury Instructions 
The use of constitutional rights in jury instructions—and in evidentiary 
practice more generally—is a subject that deserves far more attention in the bar 
and in scholarship. However, it is a challenge to get good information about what 
those uses are, and it will always be a challenge to secure better practice in the 
courts. One of many underlying practical problems is that model jury 
instructions do not exist in some jurisdictions, and in many, the pattern 
instructions are not always followed, infrequently updated, and assembled by 
court-convened or bar committees with an informal or nontransparent process. 
Jury instructions may only be called into question if a judge fails to conform to 
a constitutional standard. As a result, judges err on the side of using “technically 
correct legal language,” even if it may be incomprehensible to lay jurors.202 
Parroting constitutional rulings may seem like good insurance against appellate 
reversal. Jury instructions may be called into question when they become 
decades out of date and controversial, but the pace of change is often quite slow.  
Far more attention should be paid to whether constitutional rulings are 
actually implemented in evidentiary practice—in rules of evidence, in judicial 
rulings, and in jury instructions. Trial error is commonly not preserved on 
appeal, making poor compliance hard to remedy in the courts. Overuse of a 
constitutional test may be harder to detect or less glaring than outright violations 
of constitutional dictates. One of the main goals of this Article is to bring to light 
the fact that unintended misplacement of constitutional language can pose 
serious problems as well. 
Indeed, while it is not an example of constitutional language being misplaced 
in jury instructions, a related problem exists in the area of qualified immunity. 
In a broad set of remedial restrictions set out by the Supreme Court, executive 
officials may benefit from qualified immunity as a defense from a constitutional 
suit.203 In a constitutional tort case brought under § 1983, official defendants 
may assert qualified immunity as a defense; most are not entitled to “absolute” 
immunity from suit.204 The first question is whether “the officer’s conduct 
violated a constitutional right.”205 Second, the test asks whether an objectively 
reasonable officer in the defendant’s position would have acted that way given 
clearly established constitutional law at the time.206 In some cases, unresolved 
 
202 Wylie A. Aitken, Comment, The Jury Instruction Process—Apathy or Aggressive 
Reform?, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 137, 139 (1965). 
203 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
204 Id. 
205 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 236, 242-43 (2009) (relaxing Saucier’s two-step inquiry for determining whether 
qualified immunity applies such that the order is “no longer . . . regarded as mandatory”). 
206 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (stating that 
unlawfulness can be apparent “even in novel factual circumstances”); Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to 
say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question 
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questions of fact will make it impossible for the judge to rule on qualified 
immunity before the time of trial.207 The purposes of qualified immunity 
dissipate “once a claim has reached a jury trial, [because] concerns about 
discovery and summary judgment are moot.”208 
Thus, qualified immunity doctrine attaches to particular officers—namely 
executive officers—and at particular stages in particular proceedings—namely 
pretrial motion to dismiss and summary judgment dispositions in civil damages 
trials. As a result, it would be erroneous to rely on the Supreme Court’s qualified 
immunity law in a criminal proceeding or regarding a nonexecutive official 
(such as a judge, for whom the Court has ruled absolute immunity attaches).209 
Moreover, federal judges often misplace these qualified immunity standards at 
trial instead of just using them during pretrial. For example, they do so when 
instructing juries in § 1983 suits based on Fourth Amendment excessive force 
claims.210 The Fourth Amendment constitutional standard of reasonableness 
itself involves a complex underlying body of case law, adopting a flexible set of 
principles that state that officers generally may not use unreasonable force but 
with exceptions depending on the circumstances they face.211 As Rachel Harmon 
has put it, the jury instructions in the area “sometimes provide exceptionally 
little help in shaping a determination about excessiveness.”212 Additional 
considerations regarding the legal question of qualified immunity make the 
subject still more complex. Questions relating to qualified immunity should not 
be put to the jury “routinely”; rather, as the Supreme Court has said, “Immunity 
ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.”213  
 
has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent.” (citation omitted)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1986) (finding that qualified immunity defense may apply “if the defendant acted in an 
objectively reasonable manner”); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“We therefore hold that 
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”). 
207 See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002). 
208 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 1983 § 4.7.2, at 66 (2014) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT CIVIL 
INSTRUCTIONS], https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/4_Chap_4_2014_fall.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L93C-EANF]. 
209 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). 
210 See supra Section III.A. 
211 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (“Because ‘police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about 
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,’ the reasonableness of the 
officer’s belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene 
perspective.” (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). 
212 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1144-45 (2008). 
213 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam). 
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To be sure, a judge can reverse on summary judgment until after a jury 
verdict, but that is different than using qualified immunity as a standard that 
jurors are obligated to employ when they reach their verdict. Some courts have 
held that “[i]t is error, however, to submit the ultimate question of qualified 
immunity to the jury.”214 The rationale is that “[t]he issue of qualified immunity 
is a question of law for the court, rather than the jury, to decide: ‘[I]t is the 
province of the jury to determine disputed predicate facts, the question of 
qualified immunity is one of law for the court.’”215 But there remains “a split 
among the circuits as to the proper apportionment of responsibility between 
juries and judges in this context.”216 The Fifth Circuit has long held that “if 
[qualified immunity] is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury which 
must then determine the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ 
conduct.”217  
 
214 Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 586 (8th Cir. 2004). 
215 Id. at 584-85 (second alteration in original) (quoting Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 
F.3d 469, 473 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
216 Id. at 587; see also, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hether 
an officer made a reasonable mistake of law and is thus entitled to qualified immunity is a 
question of law that is properly answered by the court, not a jury. When a district court submits 
that question of law to a jury, it commits reversible error.” (citation omitted)); Willingham v. 
Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court should submit any questions 
of material fact to the jury but reserve legal question of qualified immunity for itself); 
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Immunity . . . is a matter of law for 
the court, to be decided without deference to the jury’s resolution—and preferably before the 
case goes to the jury.”); Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 764 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“[A]lthough the factual disputes in the instant case that must be resolved by the jury 
go both to the excessive force and to the qualified immunity questions, the qualified immunity 
issue is ‘a question of law better left for the court to decide.’” (quoting Warren v. Dwyer, 906 
F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990))); Suboh v. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(stating that questions in qualified immunity inquiry are issues of law, though they may entail 
preliminary factual determinations); Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 
2002) (“When the case goes to trial, the jury itself decides the issues of historical fact that are 
determinative of the qualified immunity defense, but the jury does not apply the law relating 
to qualified immunity to those historical facts it finds; that is the court’s duty.”); Alvarado v. 
Picur, 859 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting jury instruction that told jurors that 
defendants would be immune if their actions did not violate clearly established law, querying 
“[h]ow was the jury supposed to determine the law on the dates in question? And, if the jury 
somehow could determine the law on the dates in question, how was it supposed to determine 
if that law was ‘clearly established’?”); McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n.8 
(8th Cir. 1987) (“The court, rather than the trier of fact, is to determine ‘whether the facts 
alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law.’” (quoting Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985) (alteration in original))), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988). But see McCardle v. Haddad, 131 F.3d 43, 
50 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Where the qualified immunity defense has not been resolved prior to trial, 
it may be presented to the jury or it may be decided by the court as a matter of law.”). 
217 McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000); accord Keylon v. City of 
Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n exceptional circumstances 
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Pattern jury instructions reflect these differences.218 There is also the separate 
question of whether it may mislead jurors to hear additional instructions granting 
 
historical facts may be so intertwined with the law that a jury question is appropriate as to 
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that his conduct 
violated that right.” (quoting Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003))); 
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here the legal 
question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, the jury, 
not the judge, must determine liability.” (quoting Pouillon v. City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 
715 (6th Cir. 2000))); Sikes v. Gaytan, 218 F.3d 491, 493-94 (5th Cir. 2000) (allowing single 
jury instruction on issues of liability and qualified immunity); Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 
1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that, where factual disputes existed, qualified immunity 
question required jury’s determination); Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“So, ‘if . . . there remain disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the jury, 
properly instructed, may decide the question.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Presley v. City 
of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 1993))). 
218 See 5 LEONARD B. SAND, JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN, STEVEN A. REISS & 
NANCY BATTERMAN, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 87-86 (2001) 
(instructing jury to make determination regarding qualified immunity); MARTIN. A. 
SCHWARTZ & GEORGE C. PRATT, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 17.02.1 (2d 
ed. 2020) (instructing jury to decide qualified immunity question based on Fifth Circuit 
approach). But see COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF 
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 4.42, at 4–18 (2019), http://www.juryinstructions.ca8 
.uscourts.gov/REV4.1CivilJuryInstructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS9C-KAAA] (“[T]he 
issue of good faith immunity is an issue the judge must decide; it is not a jury issue.”); COMM. 
ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.18, at 156 (2009), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov 
/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R7H-ATCP] (stating 
Seventh Circuit’s view that qualified immunity presents no jury questions and is to be 
resolved solely by court); FIFTH CIRCUIT DIST. JUDGES ASS’N COMM. ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.3, at 94 (rev. ed. 2020), 
www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/Fifth/2020civil.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDM7-NSHR] 
(“If, after considering the scope of discretion and responsibility generally given to [specify 
type of officers/officials] in performing their duties and after considering all of the 
circumstances of this case as they would have reasonably appeared to Defendant [name] at 
the time of the [specify disputed act], you find that Plaintiff [name] failed to prove that no 
reasonable [officer/official] could have believed that the [specify disputed act] was lawful, 
then Defendant [name] is entitled to qualified immunity, and your verdict must be for 
Defendant [name] on those claims.” (alterations in original)); NINTH CIRCUIT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 9.34 cmt. (2020) 
(“The committee has not formulated any instructions concerning qualified immunity because 
most issues of qualified immunity are resolved before trial . . . .”); SCHWARTZ & PRATT, 
supra, § 17.02.1 (stating that giving qualified immunity instruction to jury is a minority view 
among jurisdictions); THIRD CIRCUIT CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 208, § 4.7.2, at 63 (“If 
there are no disputes concerning the relevant historical facts, then qualified immunity presents 
a question of law to be resolved by the court.”). Additional circuits do not have civil pattern 
jury instructions. 
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immunity separate from the question of whether the constitutional rights of the 
defendant were violated. As Judge Jon. O. Newman has commented:  
To most jurors hearing a jury instruction on the defense of qualified 
immunity, it simply sounds as if the officer should not be found liable if he 
[subjectively] thought he was behaving lawfully, and many jurors will give 
him the benefit of the doubt on that issue, even if they think his conduct 
was improper.219 
That question has real importance where a municipality may still be held 
liable for a constitutional violation even if the individual officers are found 
immune.220 The Fifth Circuit qualified immunity instruction raises still 
additional problems because it suggests to jurors that the officers’ subjective 
belief as to the reasonableness of their actions might be relevant, despite the fact 
that the Supreme Court has rejected a subjective qualified immunity test.221 
Some courts state that the jury may have a limited role in informing the 
judge’s decision regarding qualified immunity. In the Eighth Circuit, “special 
interrogatories related to [the qualified immunity] defense [are] not improper 
per se,”222 but they must be carefully crafted so that “[t]he fact-finder’s role is 
limited to determining whether the underlying facts are as the plaintiff has 
alleged or proved.”223 I, along with other commentators, view that as the 
preferable approach, although still more preferable would be to not call on jurors 
to reach any decision regarding qualified immunity.224 The remedial rules the 
 
219 Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil & 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 34 (1992) (statement of 
J. Jon O. Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). 
220 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (“[L]ocal governments, 
like every other § 1983 ‘person,’ by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for 
constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ . . . .”). 
221 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (rejecting subjective test 
in favor of “objective reasonableness” test, explaining that “[j]udicial inquiry into subjective 
motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous 
persons, including an official’s professional colleagues”). 
222 Lampkins v. Thompson, 337 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). 
223 McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988); see also Johnson v. Breeden, 
280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a defendant 
is entitled to have any evidentiary disputes upon which the qualified immunity defense turns 
decided by the jury so that the court can apply the jury’s factual determinations to the law and 
enter a post-trial decision on the defense.”); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 476 
(8th Cir. 1995) (granting new trial where district court submitted qualified immunity issue to 
jury and stating “the role of the jury in the new trial should be limited to determining what the 
officers knew at the time of the arrest. In light of the jury’s findings, the court should then 
determine the legal questions of probable cause and qualified immunity”); Warren v. Dwyer, 
906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that jury should decide any unresolved factual dispute, 
but “[t]he ultimate legal determination whether, on the facts found, a reasonable police officer 
should have known he acted unlawfully is a question of law better left for the court to decide”). 
224 See Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical 
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Supreme Court crafted to guide judicial management during motions to dismiss 
or motions for summary judgment do not and should not provide rules of 
decision for adjudicating constitutional rights in § 1983 trials for damages.  
D. Treating Floors as Ceilings 
This Article examines the use of constitutional doctrine in procedural or 
institutional contexts which it was not intended to regulate. In other words, it 
examines the transformation of constitutional doctrine intended to provide a 
floor or bare minimum protection into a ceiling beyond which actors do not 
provide further protection. This problem is particularly troubling when it results 
in underenforcement of rights by citing to federal constitutional law.  
In some contexts, however, what is a floor and what is a ceiling may be 
contested and may be unclear from Supreme Court decisions. In the equal 
protection context, the Court has developed a series of holdings forbidding not 
only certain forms of race discrimination and classifications but also some types 
of affirmative action.225 As a result, when states have enacted bars on affirmative 
action in higher education (which nine states have done),226 there is a real 
question as to whether they have raised the constitutional floor, lowered the 
constitutional ceiling, or acted consistently with or contrary to Supreme Court 
guidance.227 It is challenging to say whether such statutes are misplaced uses of 
 
Application of § 1983 as It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO 
L. REV. 571, 595-96 (2005) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit opinion that court may “rely upon 
the factual findings of the jury to decide the issue of qualified immunity,” but jury may not 
decide question of qualified immunity itself); Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision 
Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659, 681-82 (2006) (“Admittedly, in order to 
dispose of the case without trial, the judge must ask whether any reasonable jury could find 
for the non-moving party. But this does not mean that the decision rule employed by the judge 
must be worded in the same way as the decision rule for a jury.” (footnote omitted)). 
225 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that strict scrutiny 
requires more careful approach than point-based affirmative action system); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003) (finding that affirmative action program that 
considered race of applicant among many other variables satisfied strict scrutiny); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny applies 
to uses of affirmative action in employment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 289-90 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that use of quotas in higher education violates 
Equal Protection Clause). 
226 Dominique J. Baker, Why Might States Ban Affirmative Action?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 12, 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2019/04/12/why-might-
states-ban-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/NA3V-LDX8] (presenting research on nine 
states that have ever banned affirmative action, of which one state’s ban was ultimately 
reversed). 
227 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. 291, 298-315 (2014) (assessing 
whether amendment to the Constitution of Michigan prohibiting state and other governmental 
entities in Michigan from granting race-based preferences in wide range of actions and 
decisions was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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constitutional rulings from the Court, which has restricted some, but certainly 
not all, uses of affirmative action. If the Court had clearly stated that some 
affirmative action was protected—or even required—to remedy historical 
discrimination, then those statutes would raise constitutional questions. It is not 
clear whether they are building on constitutional norms (forbidding some uses 
of affirmative action) or undermining constitutional norms (remedying current 
and historical discrimination). The lack of clarity is due to the contested state of 
the Supreme Court’s doctrine; in its ruling in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action,228 the Court held that such statutes are constitutional 
expressions of voter preferences.229 
Where it is clear that constitutional rights do not apply in a setting, and yet 
they are applied in a manner that reduces protection, it might very well be the 
case that state and local actors will continue to underenforce without reference 
to the federal model. The account here is not causal. However, federal 
constitutional law may provide added justification for underenforcement, and I 
argue here that is likely why it is being relied upon in these contexts. One could 
also imagine that state and local actors might borrow federal standards to justify 
enforcement that is broader and extends beyond the constitutional floor. They 
might similarly be citing to the Constitution to justify increasing protection 
without having to fully provide the justification for doing so under state law. 
Doing so may not risk the same underprotection of rights, but it raises similar 
legitimacy concerns in which a state or locality is not making a deliberate policy 
and law choice independently.  
CONCLUSION 
In a range of important and unrelated areas of constitutional law—and 
sometimes despite the Supreme Court’s cautionary language—constitutional 
rules have taken hold outside of the administrative and procedural settings that 
they were primarily designed to regulate. What results is unanticipated and 
misplaced changes to rules and practice. This Article has described judicial 
decisions that profess not to alter an area of law but have had that very effect 
and how such decisions have had the effect of undermining (or augmenting) the 
very constitutional protections that they sought to create. Rulings by the Court 
designed to protect or elaborate the underlying constitutional right have done 
more: they have become part of the instructions given to a jury when weighing 
evidence in a case, affected rules for admissibility of expert evidence, and 
governed decisions regarding whether to prosecute police officers, among other 
things. In doing so, judicial and executive actors have eroded rights by 
overextending them to the wrong government actors or by using them in 
unintended procedural or remedial contexts.  
The problem of misplaced constitutional law should be addressed far more 
carefully by judges and other legal actors. The Supreme Court should step in to 
correct unintentional misuses of constitutional doctrine in lower courts. As 
 
228 572 U.S. 291 (2014). 
229 Id. at 313-15. 
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noted, the Court has done so in some contexts, trying to keep certain types of 
constitutional rulings confined to civil suits for damages, pretrial remedies in 
criminal cases, or post-conviction relief. That type of border control, however, 
is selective, perhaps sometimes reflecting the selective attention of the Justices. 
Further, some of these misplacements have occurred in areas—such as jury 
instructions and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—that are not readily 
challenged in litigation. They have gone unnoticed and often cannot easily be 
remedied.  
One overarching theme of this Article is that government actors should be 
more explicit and careful when deciding whether a constitutional baseline should 
inform decision-making. The Court should examine bare citations to 
constitutional standards to assess whether they are in fact applicable. Lower 
court judges and executive officials should be careful not to incorporate 
constitutional tests in ways that serve different purposes from those they were 
intended to serve, as doing so can underprotect rights or prevent government 
actors from crafting more protective rules. More clearly addressing the 
misplaced use of constitutional rights in new procedural and institutional 
contexts can help to prevent unanticipated augmentation—or worse, the 
erosion—of constitutional rights. 
